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LAW'S TERRITORY 
(A IDSTORY OF JURISDICTION) 
Richard T. Ford* 
Pop quiz: New York City. The United Kingdom. The East Bay 
Area Municipal Utilities District. Kwazulu, South Africa. The Ca­
thedral of Notre Dame. The State of California. Vatican City. 
Switzerland. The American Embassy in the U.S.S.R. What do the 
foregoing items have in common? 
Answer: they are, or were, all territorial jurisdictions. A thesis 
of this Article is that territorial jurisdictions - the rigidly mapped 
territories within which formally defined legal powers are exercised 
by formally organized governmental institutions - are relatively 
new and intuitively surprising technological developments. New, 
because until the development of modern cartography, legal au­
thority generally followed relationships of status rather than those 
of autochthony. Today jurisdiction seems inevitable, but, like 
death, it is "a habit to which consciousness has not been long 
accustomed. "1 
Surprising? We are now accustomed to territorial jurisdiction ...:.__ 
so much so that it is hard to imagine that government could be or­
ganized any other way. But despite several hundred years of accli­
mation, people continue to be disoriented, baffled, and thrilled by 
the consequences of jurisdictional legality. We are filled with some­
times grudging admiration when the latest Esmeralda evades the 
territorial reach of the pursuing constable. Examples abound, both 
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historical and fictional (or perhaps syncretic). Consider the trek of 
the musically gifted von Trapps to the safety of neutral Switzer­
land,2 the bootlegger's run of Burt Reynolds's "Bandit" who 
stopped just over the county line long enough to thumb his nose at 
"Smokey" Sheriff Buford T .  Justice,3 the heroic and desperate jour­
ney on the fugitive slave's underground railroad, the once heroic, 
now demonized, pregnant foreigner who struggles over the border 
in time to give birth on American soil and thereby guarantees her 
child American citizenship. 
This last example illustrates another thesis of this Article. Terri­
torial jurisdiction produces political and social identities. Jurisdic­
tions define the identity of the people that occupy them. The 
jurisdictional boundary does more than separate territory; it also 
separates types of people: native from foreign, urbanites from 
country folk, citizen from alien, slave from free. 
To some extent, jurisdictional identities are chosen; in some 
cases, an individual can move between jurisdictions and thereby 
adopt the identity of her new location. Many commentators have 
suggested that this type of mobility makes territorially based rela­
tions akin to voluntary contracts. The mobile individual "shops" 
for a jurisdiction just as a suburban shopper roams the mall looking 
for the right Christmas gift.4 But in important ways territorial iden­
tities cannot be freely chosen. Even if physical presence alone will 
establish membership, one is forced to accept a "bundle" of juris­
dictionally linked items. I cannot live in San Francisco while paying 
Los Angeles taxes and receiving Los Angeles's package of services, 
nor can I pick and choose among the San Francisco services I wish 
to receive and pay for. While economic markets generally resist 
bundling, the jurisdictional "market" always bundles. 
More importantly, many territorial "locations" are simply not 
"for sale." One cannot, for instance, become a British subject sim­
ply by deciding to move to the United Kingdom. And even within a 
nation-state, mobility is limited by legal rules that restrict the avail­
ability of housing in certain jurisdictions, often for the explicit pur­
pose of controlling in-migration.5 These types of restrictions are 
2. See the enchanting, if treacly, THE SoUND OF Music (1\ventieth Century Fox 1965). 
3. See that classic of late 1970s low brow decadence, SMOKEY AND THE BANDIT {Univer­
sal 1977). 
4. See, e.g., Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. PoL. EcoN. 
416 {1956). 
5. See, e.g., Ambler Realty v. City of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 {1924) (upholding zoning 
ordinance that restricted multi-family housing, writing "[The purpose of the zoning ordi­
nance] is to classify the population and segregate them according to their income or situation 
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justified as necessary to maintain community character - a ration­
ale somewhat at odds with the aspiration that membership in juris­
dictions be freely chosen. Hence, territorial identities are in an 
important sense remnants of the era before the modern hegemony 
of contractual social relations chronicled by Sir Henry Maine.6 
Like the social positions of the family, they are largely involuntary 
relationships of status. 
The word "remnants" is somewhat misleading: it suggests that 
these territorial identities are survivors of a bygone era. To the con­
trary, this Article will suggest that territorial identities were re­
cently invented and grew in importance just as other status 
relationships were in decline - in fact, in some instances, territorial 
identities displaced other statuses. Territorial identities developed 
and matured along with the advance of modern, scientific cartogra­
phy. Once cartography made the production of precisely demar­
cated legal territories possible, territorial relationships quickly 
became dominant. The territorialization of social relations served 
important institutional purposes more effectively than did the older 
status relationships. Hence the famous historical shift from status 
to contract was accompanied by an equally significant shift from 
status to locus. 
Jurisdictions define both national and sub-national territories. 
This Article will primarily deal with sub-national jurisdictions. It is 
fairly obvious that the creation of national territories and national 
identities has been a major project of national governments. Na­
tion building is commonly understood as, in part, the process of na­
tional institutions asserting control by destroymg smaller territorial 
divisions and affiliations. But the production of sub-national terri­
tories and identities has also been an important part of national de­
velopment. The centralization of formal power in national 
governments is not necessarily inconsistent with the existence of 
sub-national territorial divisions. In fact, this Article will argue that 
the production of local jurisdictions and local cultures was and is 
often a by-product of the centralization of political power. Indeed, 
the production of local difference can be an effective strategy for 
consolidating and maintaining centralized power. Therefore, this 
in life."), overmled by Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Village of 
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding zoning ordinance that prohibited cohabi­
tation by three or more persons unrelated by blood or marriage). 
6. See generally HENRY SUMNER MAINE, .ANCIENT LAw 165 (Univ. of Ariz. Press 1986) 
(1864) ("[T]he movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from 
Status to Contract."). 
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Article will interrogate and disrupt a facile but misleading opposi­
tion between centralization and local autonomy. 
Part I of this Article will discuss territorial jurisdiction as a spa­
tial structure and as a "governmental technique"7 as then-Associate 
Justice Rehnquist once referred to it. It will introduce two opposed 
rhetorical descriptions of territorial jurisdiction - organic and syn­
thetic - both of which correspond to a distinct type of political 
subjectivity. 
Part II will present a partial history of territorial jurisdiction, 
tracking the emergence and development of legal territories in sev­
eral socio-historical contexts. This history calls into doubt the com­
mon intuition that territorial jurisdiction is a timeless feature or 
foundation of government. Instead, jurisdiction was invented at a 
specific historical moment and deployed to advance certain identifi­
able projects. Jurisdiction transformed both the way government 
operated and, ultimately, the structure of government itself. 
Part III will argue that jurisdiction establishes a form of status 
identity. Specifically, it will explore in greater detail the territorial 
construction of political subjectivity that occurs through jurisdic­
tion. It will argue that even seemingly natural or organic territorial 
communities are often the products of larger governmental strate­
gies that produce a hierarchy of political subjectivities. This gives 
us reason for caution when tempted to assert territorial group soli­
darity in order to obtain autonomy for minority groups. Too often 
the mirage of autonomy hides the bleak reality of social quarantine. 
Part IV will argue for a theory of jurisdiction that treats jurisdic­
tional arrangements as the architecture of government. It will ar­
gue that such a theory of jurisdiction would allow us to see many 
contemporary legal conflicts in a new light. 
Part V is a short conclusion. 
!. THE BOUNDARIES OF DEMOCRACY 
A. Space Oddity8: A Tale of Two Jurisdictions 
I would like to introduce territorial jurisdiction in the context of 
a relatively mundane legal dispute. 
Holt is a small, largely rural, unincorporated community located on 
the northeastern outskirts of Tuscaloosa ... Alabama. Because the 
community is within the three-mile police jurisdiction circumscribing 
7. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 72 (1978). 
8. Apologies to Stanley Kubrick, see 2001: A SPA CE ODYSSEY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
1968), and David Bowie, see DAVID BoWIE, SPA CE ODDITY (Mercury Records 1969). 
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Tuscaloosa's corporate limits, its residents are subject to the city's 
"police [and] sanitary regulations." Holt residents are also subject to 
the criminal jurisdiction of the city's court, and to the city's power to 
license businesses, trades, and professions . . . . [The Holt residents] 
claimed that the city's extraterritorial exercise of the police powers 
over Holt residents, without a concomitant extension of the franchise 
on an equal footing with those residing within the corporate limits, 
denies [them] rights secured by the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 
Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa presents a seemingly in­
tractable problem: what non-tautological justification exists for any 
particular limitation of the franchise? A typical answer is that the 
geographical limits of the jurisdiction in which the elected body is 
authoritative provide a justification. But, as Holt demonstrates, this 
simply displaces the problem. Rather than expressing the conflict 
in terms of the franchise, one could as easily describe it in terms of 
the jurisdictional boundaries. Why, in this instance, should the 
boundary of the City of Tuscaloosa not include the residents of the 
community of Holt? 
The specificity of the jurisdictional question is highlighted in 
Holt precisely because there is little else at stake. Although the 
community of Holt is "governed" by Tuscaloosan institutions, it 
seems that few of these institutions make controversial substantive 
decisions. Local courts and police enforce state law while sanitary 
and business regulations are relatively technical in nature and are 
not generally a source of political conflict. Thus, rather than focus­
ing on a substantive harm, Holt centers on the definition of political 
community. Holt raises a vexing problem for normative democratic 
theory, akin to the dilemma of forced annexation and minority se­
cession: taking the principle of majority rule as a given, how are we 
to define the limits of the community within which a majority will 
rule? 
At first glance there would seem to be only two possibilities: 
the relevant political community either includes the residents of 
Holt as well as those of Tuscaloosa, or it only includes the residents 
of Tuscaloosa. 
There are in fact three possible answers. · 
Answer One: The political community is the police jurisdiction 
of Tuscaloosa, including Holt. The exercise of even limited police 
power over the residents of Holt is determinative - those subject 
to a direct exercise of the police power must be enfranchised to 
9. Holt, 439 U.S. at 61-63 (second alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). 
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control that power. This answer is appealing. After all, what legiti­
mate reason could Tuscaloosa have for excluding the residents of 
Holt from the political process? The risk that the residents of Holt 
may, on average, hold different views from those of Tuscaloosa and 
therefore alter the outcomes of political contests does not seem to 
be a legitimate reason for excluding them. The democratic process 
is designed to resolve differences between people of different views. 
But on reflection it is not clear that disagreement is always a bad 
reason to exclude a group from a political community. A primary 
reason for multiple and distinct territorial jurisdictions is inescap­
ably to separate distinctive groups of people with distinctive views 
and desires. Why have several European nation-states as opposed 
to a United States of Europe? Ask any British gent, German frau­
lein or French mademoiselle and you'll likely be told: "Because we 
are so different, each nation. Our way of life would be destroyed if 
we constantly had to compromise with foreigners." Why do we in­
sist on maintaining fifty separate state governments, with their in­
consistent and cumbersome state laws, state bureaucracies, flags, 
license plates, mottoes and state birds? An important reason is that 
many Americans think that the states have separate characters 
worth preserving and that the citizens of each state are different 
from those of the others and should, at least for certain purposes, 
be able to act based only on the views of insiders. Why do we have 
separate local governments, defining city and suburb, rich and poor, 
racial and religious communities? Again, many people think that 
these jurisdictions define political groups or communities that have 
some moral weight. If territorial groups do have moral weight, 
sometimes we must restrict the franchise to such a select group. 
In fact, the word "sometimes" is misplaced. We always restrict 
the franchise to a select group; the question is how such a group is 
defined. The institution of jurisdiction is one significant mechanism 
for defining the boundaries of the political community and hence 
the limits of the franchise. 
Answer Two: The political community is the corporate jurisdic­
tion of the City of Tuscaloosa (excluding Holt). Tuscaloosa's exer­
cise of control over residents of unincorporated Holt is immaterial. 
As the majority opinion points out, any "city's decisions inescap­
ably affect individuals living immediately outside its borders. . . . 
Yet no one would suggest that nonresidents . .. have a constitu-
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tional right to participate in the political processes bringing [them] 
about."10 
One might object that Holt residents are directly affected by 
Tuscaloosa's regulations. But this does not distinguish those living 
in Holt from a host of other non Tuscaloosans who may own prop­
erty in Tuscaloosa or enter Tuscaloosa to work, shop, visit friends, 
etc. They too are subject to Tuscaloosa's police power. They may 
pay Tuscaloosa's property taxes and be subject to its land use plan­
ning; drive through Tuscaloosa streets, subject to arrest by its police 
officers; patronize Tuscaloosa's business and indirectly pay its busi­
ness taxes and benefit from and bear the costs of its regulations; 
and yet they are denied the right to influence its government 
through the ballot box. Local decisions affect outsiders because 
people trade and socialize across jurisdictional lines. "But ... the 
fact that people trade with one another rather extensively does not 
mean that they care to be brought together in a more solemn asso­
ciation, as citizens in a common polity. Nor does it suggest that it 
would be good for them to be joined in that way."11 
Perhaps the Court could have held that local autonomy, the 
constitutional·recognition of a solemn political union, justified the 
jurisdictional arrangement at issue in Holt. But there is no constitu­
tional principle of local autonomy. For constitutional purposes, lo­
cal governments are not solemn political associations but rather 
subdivisions of state government. No constitutionally recognized 
value protected the integrity of Tuscaloosa's boundaries. The state 
could expand the corporate jurisdiction to include the citizens of 
Holt or reduce the police jurisdiction to coincide with the corporate 
jurisdiction with or without the consent of the government or the 
people of Tuscaloosa. 
This brings us to the improbable but dispositive .. . 
Answer Three: The political community is neither the corpo­
rate, nor the police jurisdiction of Tuscaloosa, but rather the juris­
diction of the state ·of Alabama. The Holt majority ultimately 
concludes: "[T]his Court does not sit to determine whether Ala­
bama has chosen the soundest or most practical form of internal 
10. Holt, 439 U.S. at 69. 
11. HADLEY ARKEs, THE PHILOSOPHER IN THE CITY 325 (1981). Of course the residents 
of Holt do more than trade with Tuscaloosa; they are actually governed by Tuscaloosa in 
their place of residence. But to assert that residence is the distinguishing characteristic is 
tautological. It only follows that the residents of Holt are also residents of the political com­
munity of Tuscaloosa if one already accepts the premise that the political community must 
include anyone subject to the governmental power in their place of residence. But this is 
precisely what is at issue in the case. 
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government possible. Authority to make those judgments resides in 
the state legislature, and Alabama citizens are free to urge their 
proposals to that body."12 
Note the dual move. First, the Holt Court describes the local 
jurisdiction not in terms of political community or local solidarity, 
but instead as a "form of internal government,"13 "[a] convenient 
agenc[y] for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State 
as may be entrusted to [it]."14 Local government boundaries are 
simply another �et of state laws, subject to the state political pro­
cess. Second, it then follows that the only relevant political process 
occurs at the statewide level. All Alabama citizens, Holt residents 
and Tuscaloosans alike, are equally entitled to vote in Alabama 
elections and can "urge their proposals"15 to change the local juris­
dictional arrangement at that level of government. If the Holt resi­
dents lose in the statewide political process, too bad; they have no 
constitutional claim to a different outcome. 
The right to vote - which state government could not deny its 
citizens absent a compelling justification - simply does not apply 
to Holt residents who wish to vote in Tuscaloosa's elections. It is 
well understood that a bona fide residency requirement for exercise 
of the franchise in a territorial jurisdiction is a constitutionally per­
missible limitation on the right to vote.16 The desire to limit the 
vote to residents of the jurisdiction is, ipso facto, a compelling justi­
fication; the state need not offer a compelling justification, or in­
deed any justification, for the location of any particular set of 
boundaries. -
But how, one may ask, can limiting the vote to residents be a 
compelling justification for abridging a fundamental - perhaps the 
most fundamental - constitutional right when the criteria for the 
limitation (the location of the boundaries that define residence in 
the jurisdiction) are never justified? The court does not address 
this question. 
Nor could it. The boundaries that define territorial jurisdictions 
are a legal paradox because they are both absolutely compelling 
and hopelessly arbitrary. In one sense, all jurisdictional boundaries 
are arbitrary: that separating France from Germany or the United 
12. Holt, 439 U.S. at 73-74 (emphasis added). 
13. Holt, 439 U.S. at 74. 
14. Holt, 439 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added). 
15. Holt, 439 U.S. at 74. 
16. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972); Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 
(1904). 
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States from Canada as much so as that separating Holt from Tusca­
loosa. Yet, at the same time, an unwavering faith in the necessity 
and legitimacy of those boundaries would seem to be· not only a 
foundation of our government, but a precondition of any govern­
ment. Our reaction to the formality of jurisdictional arrangements 
is not that snide condescension or righteous outrage that we direct 
at malleable human institutions (the IRS for example, or the 
United Nations) but rather something akin to the reverence and 
awe we reserve for natural phenomena beyond our control or com­
prehension. When the von Trapps reach Switzerland, only the sim­
plest child dares to ask, "Why don't the Nazis just cross the border 
to get them?" It is simply understood by those with a jurisdictional 
frame of mind (and how quickly we develop it, tutored by such 
compelling stories!) that they can't cross the line, that if they do 
their authority will vanish like Cinderella's carriage at the stroke of 
midnight. The logic of government is the logic of jurisdiction -
question it and all that is solid melts into air. 
Holt is instructive because embedded within this rather pedes­
trian conflict are the discursive elements that are common to many, 
perhaps all, jurisdictional conflicts. We will see these arguments 
many times again as we explore the history of jurisdiction. On the 
one hand we have a conception, advanced by the Holt dissent, of 
jurisdiction as a self-validating and foundational unit of govern­
ment, the political community that is premised on the "reciprocal 
relationship between the process of government and those who sub­
ject themselves to that process by choosing to live within the area of 
its authoritative application."17 Although the Holt majority rejects 
this conception of jurisdiction for local government, it tacitly em­
ploys it for the political process of the state government. On the 
other hand we have a diametrically opposed conception, advanced 
by the Holt majority in its description of Tuscaloosa, of jurisdiction 
as a "governmental technique,"18 a simple policy tool no different 
than any other agency created by law and vindicated by the political 
process. 
Both of these common understandings of jurisdictional subdivi­
sions foreclose any consideration of territorial jurisdiction itself as a 
governmental institution. The jurisdiction is either an arm of the 
state, of no particular interest except as a matter of narrow adminis­
trative technique (is it "efficient"?), or it is an organic political com-
17. Holt, 439 U.S. at 82 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
18. Holt, 439 U.S. at 72 (describing the extraterritorial exercise of municipal power). 
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munity, a self-validating form of democratic self-rule. Holt is 
disquieting because it upsets these easy ideological descriptions;19 
the hybrid Tuscaloosa police jurisdiction, this dangerous jurisdic­
tional supplement, foregrounds the significance of jurisdictions for 
democratic ideals.20 
B. Mapping Jurisdiction 
For our purposes, several characteristics define the modern ter­
ritorial jurisdiction. These characteristics are not typical, but proto­
typical. This definition will necessarily be extreme as compared to 
actual jurisdictions in practice. 
(1) A territorial jurisdiction categorizes the elements over which 
authority is to be exercised primarily by area, and secondarily, if at 
all, by type. It may also refer to several specific types of things, or 
be defined much more broadly. It will always, however, be defined 
by area. An entity could, in theory, have authority over "all oil, 
wherever it is found." Such an entity would not be a jurisdiction 
but an authority of another kind. A jurisdiction is territorially 
defined. 
(2) It is definitely bounded. The boundaries are not ambiguous 
or contested except in anomalous cases or in times of crisis or tran­
sition. If ambiguity arises, it is usually a source of concern and em­
barrassment and is settled as quickly as possible. The geographic 
19. Holt may seem aberrational, but it does not deal with an aberrational form of govern­
ment. At the time of the decision, 35 states allowed municipal governments to exercise extra­
territorial jurisdiction. See Holt, 439 U.S. at 72. 
20. This opposition between jurisdiction as foundational and jurisdiction as "mere tech­
nique" is closely related to the distinction that the Holt opinion makes between those juris­
dictions that are thought inherently to possess sovereignty and those jurisdictions that are 
thought only to exercise power derived from a greater sovereign entity. In Holt, the majority 
opinion is premised on the established legal principle that local governments do not exercise 
independent power but only the power that state governments allow them to exercise. This is 
the necessary implication of the majority's suggestion that disgruntled Alabamans may "urge 
their proposals" to limit Tuscaloosa's extraterritorial jurisdiction to the state legislature. See 
Holt, 439 U.S. at 74. 
For the most part, this Article will focus on jurisdictions that are formally subordinate to 
larger sovereigns. But we must not overstate the distinction. A sharp distinction between 
sovereign and subordinate jurisdictions is overly formalistic and misleading. For instance, we 
may intuitively believe that nation-states are sovereign jurisdictions while the subdivisions of 
the nation-states are subordinate. But in those nations, like the United States, where repre­
sentation in federal government is determined by jurisdictional subdivisions, one could assert 
that the combination of subdivisions is sovereign. It is often difficult to determine whether a 
sovereign jurisdiction chronologically or normatively precedes its jurisdictional subdivisions, 
or whether it is simply the sum of its subdivisions. 
Further, many "subordinate" jurisdictions are explicitly modeled as minor sovereigns 
rather than as instruments of larger jurisdictions. For example, despite their formally 
subordinate status, a common conception of American local governments is that of "impe­
rium in imperio": a sovereignty within a sovereign. 
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boundaries of a jurisdiction are a "bright line" rule, never a flexible 
standard. 
(3) It is abstractly and homogeneously conceived. Rather than 
defining the relevant territory according to concrete factors such as 
population, resources or other elements susceptible to narrative ex­
plication, jurisdiction refers to an abstract area. By abstract I mean 
simply that the space of a jurisdiction is conceived of independently 
of any specific attribute of that space. Alabama law does not give 
Tuscaloosa police jurisdiction over Holt specifically. Instead it gives 
Tuscaloosa jurisdiction over everything within three miles of its cor­
porate borders; the specifics are not enumerated.21 
This empty space is a conception that is facilitated, if not made 
possible, by the modem, areal map.22 The map is the primary rep­
resentation of abstract space. A typical map of New York City's 
five boroughs shows us little of significance about life in the Big 
Apple, but it definitively establishes the areal limits of each bor­
ough. Of course, other representations of abstract space are possi­
ble, but most refer to maps, such as the notation in a treaty between 
nations that refers to a cartographic grid of latitude and longitude, 
or the language in a property title that refers to an official chart of 
plots. 
(a) One consequence of this abstract presentation of space is 
that it eliminates the need for the specific enumeration and classifica­
tion by kind. 23 When novel or unpredictable circumstances arise, 
we do not suffer "gaps" or "conflicts" of authority while decision 
makers decide who is in control. One need not ask whether the 
municipal government of New York City has authority over immi-
21. See Holt, 439 U.S. at 61 n.1. Alabama's extraterritorial jurisdiction statute reads, in 
relevant part: . 
The police jurisdiction in cities having 6,000 or more inhabitants shall cover all adjoining 
territory within three miles of the corporate limits, and in cities having less than 6,000 
inhabitants and in towns, such police jurisdiction shall extend also to the adjoining terri­
tory within a mile and a half of the corporate limits of such city or town. 
Ordinances of a city or town enforcing police or sanitary regulations and prescribing 
fines and penalties for violations thereof shall have force and effect in the limits of the 
city or town and in the police jurisdiction thereof and on any property or rights-of-way 
belonging to the city or town. 
Holt, 439 U.S. at 61 n.1. 
22. Contrast the concrete, lived space of a physically bounded structure, such as a build­
ing or walled city. There, the space defined by walls is physically transformed, it is exper­
ienced as a distinct place. In most cases, specific attributes of the space account for the 
decision to place it within the physical barrier. A mapped space, by contrast, can be defined 
before any settlement has taken place, indeed ,before the territory in question has even been 
visited by the cartographer. A mapped space may offer no clue as to its boundaries. It is 
experienced not in person, but only through the map. 
23. See ROBERT DAVID SACK, HUMAN TERRITORIALITY: hs THEORY AND HISTORY 32 
(1986). 
854 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:843 
grants who arrive in its territory because it has authority over all 
people within the jurisdiction. We need not ask whether the state 
of Texas may tax or regulate newly discovered oil deposits within 
the territory of Texas, because it has the authority to tax and regu­
late all land uses within its jurisdiction. 
(b) A close corollary of the above is that jurisdictional space 
may serve to obscure social relations and the distribution of re­
sources. General purpose jurisdictions such as municipal govern­
ments, counties, states and nation-states govern such a wide range 
of activities that it is impossible to list them all, much less uncover 
the reasons for their control by a particular governmental institu­
tion. Similarly, even limited or single-purpose jurisdictions are es­
tablished with multiple purposes - electoral districts are drawn to 
facilitate or thwart certain political parties, social groups, geo­
graphic interests, etc. - that are never enumerated and are impos­
sible to uncover. 
( c) Another aspect of abstraction is that jurisdiction tends to 
present social and political relationships as impersonal. 24 Rather 
than define authority according to status relationships such as caste, 
race, religion or title, jurisdiction seems to level and equalize social 
relations, at least within the jurisdictional space. Everyone who 
buys something in the jurisdiction of New York City pays city sales 
taxes, not only "peasants" or Protestants or "people who voted for 
Ruth Messenger." As we shall see, this impersonal leveling is often 
more illusory than real. Nevertheless, it is a significant ambition of 
jurisdiction to render political relationships impersonal and 
objective. 
( d) Finally, jurisdictional space is conceptually empty. 
Although any number of specific things and social relationships -
wildlife habitats, informal communities, Native American settle­
ments - may be present in, and even in part defined by, the space 
in question, jurisdiction tends to reduce space to an empty vessel 
for governmental power. 
( 4) Jurisdictional divisions tend to produce "gapless" maps of 
contiguous political territories. The modem world is divided into 
jurisdictions. Gaps or zones of unclaimed or ambiguously appor­
tioned territory are anomalous. 
24. See id. at 33. 
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C. Performing Territory: Jurisdiction as a Social Practice 
It is tempting to examine jurisdiction solely in terms of its mate­
rial/spatial attributes, as if it were simply an object or a built struc­
ture. But jurisdiction is also a discourse, a way of speaking and 
understanding the social world. Much of what is fascinating and 
vexing about territorial jurisdiction is that it is simultaneously a ma­
terial technology, a built environment and a discursive intervention. 
These elements cannot be neatly severed. Further, no one level is 
foundational and the others epiphenomena!. Instead, all three 
levels are equally essential. To properly understand jurisdiction we 
must reject the way of thinking that neatly severs fact from repre­
sentation or "the material" from "the discursive." 
1. Jurisdiction as a Bundle of Practices 
[Mapping] became a lethal instrument to concretize the projected de­
sire on the earth's surface . ... Communication theory and common 
sense alike persuade us that a map is a scientific abstraction of reality. 
A map merely represents something which already exists objectively. 
[But at times] this relationship was reversed. A map anticipated a 
spatial reality, not vice versa. In other words, a map was a model for, 
rather than a model of, what it purported to represent.25 
Perhaps it is best to think of territorial jurisdiction as a set of 
social practices, a code of etiquette. Social practices must be 
learned and communicated to others. They exist in the realm of 
discourse, they are representations of approved behavior as well as 
the behavior itself. For example, the social practice called "the 
Tango" is a combination of the diagram that "maps" the steps and 
the actual movement of individuals in rhythm (hopefully) and to 
music: "When dancing the tango, the man leads and the lady fol­
lows, each partner should move according to the diagram." These 
representations have material consequences; they determine who 
leads and who follows as well as where one places one's feet. It is 
both an actual spatial practice and the graphical representation of 
that practice. One could learn to dance the Tango just by watching 
people actually dance, but the diagrams standardize the learning 
process and thereby in a real sense define the dance itself. Note 
that it would be absurd to describe dance notation as "ideology" or 
"legitimation" as if it misled us as to the nature of the practice. Yet 
it would also be incomplete to think of it as an innocent description, 
25. THONGCHAI WINICHAKUL, SIAM MAPPED: A HISTORY OF TiiE GEO-BODY OF A 
NATION 129-30 (1994). 
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as if the graphical representation only describes and has nothing to 
do with perpetuating and regulating the "actual practice." 
Similarly, jurisdiction is a function of its graphical and verbal 
descriptions; it is a set of practices that are performed by individuals 
and groups who learn to "dance the jurisdiction" by reading de­
scriptions of jurisdictions and by looking at maps. This does not 
mean that jurisdiction is "mere ideology," that the lines between 
various nations, cities and districts "aren't real." Of course the lines 
are real, but they are real because they are constantly being made 
real, by county assessors levying property taxes, by police pounding 
the beat (and stopping at the city limits), by registrars of voters 
checking identification for proof of residence. Without these prac­
tices the lines would not "be real" - the lines don't preexist the 
practices. 
Of course each of these practices can be described as "respond­
ing" to the lines or working within the lines rather than making 
them. When we think of the practices as happening "within the 
lines" and imagine that the boundary lines exist independently of 
the practices that give them significance, we think of jurisdiction in 
the abstract, removed from any particular social content. We imag­
ine that jurisdiction is the space drawn on a map, rather than a col­
lection of rules that can be represented graphically as a map. 
For many purposes, this way of thinking about jurisdiction is 
perfectly reasonable; sometimes everyone understands the jurisdic­
tional dance and knows where to step. At these times the map does 
seem to precede the practices. Indeed, the representation of juris­
dictional space may at times precede the actual practices that give a 
jurisdiction life and meaning. Nevertheless, we must not treat juris­
diction as a thiµg that precedes practice. Lines on a map may antic­
ipate a jurisdiction, but a jurisdiction itself consists of the practices 
that make the abstract space depicted on a map significant. More­
over, when the stakes of a jurisdiction are in question, as they were 
in Holt, one cannot simply refer to lines on a map. In order to 
understand the significance of jurisdiction as an institution, we must 
constantly remind ourselves that jurisdiction is itself a set of prac­
tices, not a preexisting thing in which practices occur or to which 
practices relate. 
2. The Forbidden Dance: Jurisdiction as Production of 
Status Identity 
The Tango, like many dances, establishes quite specific roles for 
the individual dancers. There is a male and a female role, quite 
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assertively marked by costume (suits for the gents,' glamorous and 
often aggressively sexy dresses for the ladies) as well as by the re­
quirements of the dance steps. The male "leads" and the female 
"follows." There is a set of prescribed actions that rely on the as­
sumed superior physical strength of the person occupying the male 
position and the assumed diminutive size and gracefulness of the 
person occupying the female position. These positions can be seen 
as simple reflections of a preexisting reality. There is a distinction 
between men and women based in biological nature which corre­
sponds to a number of characteristics such as strength, size, asser­
tiveness and gracefulness. The dance just reflects these facts. 
Because men are more assertive they lead while the more submis­
sive women follow. 
But this way of thinking too easily assumes a relationship of 
cause and effect. It may be, on the contrary, that hundreds of social 
practices, of which the Tango is one, construct these gendered roles 
and encourage people to conform to them. A physically strong, tall 
and assertive woman will not be offered the "male" position, even if 
she is naturally well suited for it. She will be encouraged by dance 
instructors, parents, potential partners and friends to conform to 
the female role: learn to accept the guidance of the male, develop 
grace at the expense of strength. 
Notice that it may become very difficult to distinguish between 
"coerced" and "voluntary" conformity to the status roles. Our 
strong and assertive woman will find it easier to 'conform to the 
female role than to attack the Tango's structure. No one need force 
her in the sense of establishing formal punishment for assertive 
women. Instead, the status quo effectively sanctions her assertive­
ness by depriving her of acceptable roles in which she can be asser­
tive. Her friends will sanction her by telling her that she could get a 
date easily if she were a bit "nicer" or "more feminine." Men will 
silently punish her by refusing to ask her to dance. If she wants to 
dance, she will conform. Over time conformity will become "sec­
ond nature." Our now accomplished dancer will remember her as­
sertive past as an "awkward phase" that she grew out of, as a 
butterfly emerges from a cocoon. At that point the status will have 
also become her identity. 
To some extent, the dance is a highly stylized context in which 
gender identity and gender status is performed. The Tango teaches 
us that men and women have different statuses because they have 
different natures. It builds a status and simultaneously justifies that 
status as a biological or natural fact. It provides its own evidenti:µ-y 
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justification: men and women in fact behave differently while danc­
ing; they demonstrate by their own actions that the premise of the 
gendered dance is accurate.26 
Similarly, jurisdiction constructs legal statuses. The meaning of 
Tuscaloosa's police jurisdiction is that some citizens have the status 
of "voting resident" while others have the status of "nonvoting per­
son subject to regulation in their place of residence" (perhaps the 
choreographic analogy would be "dancer" versus "wallflower"). It 
is also true that jurisdiction constructs statuses or identities based 
on the type of jurisdiction with which one is associated: one's juris­
dictional position is analogous to the gendered positions in the cho­
reographed dance. When we perform these jurisdictional roles 
often enough they too become "second nature."27 But this type of 
"second nature" is the product of social practices that are enforced 
by social custom and, more importantly, by law.2s 
D. The Sacred and the Profane: Speaking Jurisdiction 
What follows in this section is a description of a discourse or a 
set of understandings about jurisdictions. In legal and political dis­
course, jurisdictions are described through a dialogical opposition: 
they are either organic/authentic or synthetic/convenient. This de­
scriptive opposition is a central part of the jurisdictional perform­
ance, just as the opposed male and female roles are indispensable to 
the performance of the Tango. The opposition informs our thinking 
about a given jurisdiction at a given moment. But the description 
does not necessarily define any given jurisdiction in a permanent 
sense. Nor is it an innocent description of a preexisting reality. In­
stead, the same jurisdiction may be understood as "organic" in one 
context and "synthetic" in another. For instance, the city of Tusca-
26. I owe this line of analysis regarding gender to Judith Butler. See generally Juo1n1 
BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1990). Note that it is not necessary to deny the existence of 
biological differences between the sexes in order to question the thoughtless conflation of 
these biological differences witlx a host of social differences. 
27. Consider tlxe plaintiffs in Holt: tlxeir objection was not to the substance of any partic­
ular regulation that the city of Tuscaloosa imposed, but rather to the mere fact of being 
subject to Tuscaloosa's extraterritorial regulation. See Holt, 439 U.S. at 62. If the state of 
Alabama had subjected the co=unity of Holt to identical regulations we would most likely 
react witlx indifference, although tlxe effect on Holt residents would be almost identical. In 
botlx cases, the option available to Holt residents who wished to change the regulations 
would be the same: attempt to lobby the state legislature. 
28. In no way do I wish to suggest that because it produces statuses, jurisdiction - much 
less tlxe Tango! - should be abolished. Nor is the answer to replace structured practices with 
fluid ones that allow individuals autonomy - all dance must be modem interpretive dance! 
Down witlx choreography! At this point, I simply wish to draw attention to an aspect of 
territorial jurisdiction that has been overlooked and to suggest that this aspect is not acciden­
tal, but instead a central and indispensable function of the jurisdiction. 
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loosa was thought of as an "organic" political community by the 
dissenting justices, and as a "synthetic" governmental technique by 
the majority. This section will focus, not on the truth or falsity of 
either description of jurisdiction, but instead on the terms of the 
debate.29 
1. Organic Jurisdictions 
Organic jurisdictions are the natural outgrowth of circum­
stances, conditions and principles that, morally, preexist the state. 
They are, in Durkheim's terms, Gemeinshaft communities.30 They 
are defined socially rather than metrically, concretely rather than 
abstractly. The space of an organic jurisdiction is personal, authen­
tic, encumbered, sacred. An organic jurisdiction is legitimated by 
its pedigree. 
For example, a local government may be understood as a natu­
ral outgrowth of a social and economic community - a town or 
agricultural collective - that preexists state intervention and would 
exist with or without such intervention. An organic community 
may be united primarily by economy or by culture. For example, 
certain jurisdictions may be thought to be the outgrowth of certain 
geographically-based economic interests - trading or manufactur­
ing, maritime or landlocked, cotton producing or wheat harvesting 
- while others may be thought to reflect the cultural particularities 
of their inhabitants. Many of course, combine both economic and 
cultural foundations. The Amish of Pennsylvania, for instance, are 
distinct in both economic and cultural dimensions. 
The ideological foundation of nation-states is primarily that of 
organicism; nations are thought to represent "a people" who are 
both distinctive and relatively homogeneous. The French are 
united not only by language but by something called "culture": a 
set of practices, significant artifacts, beliefs, styles, a certain je ne 
sais quoi. 
29. Hence this Article will employ the terms "organic (or synthetic) conception" and "or­
ganic (or synthetic) description" interchangeably to mean the mode of discourse that 
presents the given jurisdiction as organic (or synthetic). Further, the terms "organic jurisdic­
tion" and "synthetic jurisdiction" refer, not to the essence of the jurisdiction in question, but 
instead to the way that it is understood and perceived. This perception will, of course, affect 
the material nature of the jurisdiction and the nature of the social relations of its inhabitants. 
The term "organic (or synthetic) jurisdiction" is meant to refer to such effects as well as to 
the rhetorical representation of the jurisdiction, but it is not meant to assert a core ontologi­
cal status. 
30. See FERDINAND TONNIES, COMMUNITY & SocIETY 12-14, 277 n.27 (Charles P. 
Loomis ed. & trans., 1957). 
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Organic jurisdictions appear as matters of right and are de­
fended against attack in terms of autonomy, self-determination and 
cultural preservation. Organic jurisdictions are understood as both 
natural facts and as the outgrowth of principles. The combination 
of the two serve to imbue jurisdictions with an air of the inevitable. 
For instance, it is assumed to be a relatively prepolitical fact that 
there exists a French culture or a lifestyle of the American South. 
Liberal societies cherish the principle that social groups should be 
allowed to exist and flourish, free of governmental interference. 
The conclusion seems inevitable: the jurisdictions that "house" and 
protect such social groups are natural and must be respected and 
preserved. 
Moreover, the organic conception posits an organic relationship 
between such groups and the territory they occupy. It is not simply 
that the groups themselves are of primary importance, but also that 
the groups' identities depend on their control over a particular ter­
ritory, a significant and culturally encumbered place. It follows that 
nonjurisdictional means of providing such a group with power and 
security will not suffice. Indeed, in the most extreme examples, 
even a substitute territory will not do - the land and the people 
are one. Imagine, for instance, the reaction of the Mormons if 
asked to move en mass from Salt Lake City to another city where 
they would enjoy comparable power, or consider the relationship of 
Palestinians and Israelis to Jerusalem. 
In terms of political representation the organic jurisdiction has 
moral weight independent of its citizens. It is not simply a 
container of citizens. For example, the American states are equally 
represented in the Senate, regardless of their population: as a for­
mal matter Alaska is the equal of California. An organic territory 
is thought to define a cohesive entity with united and unique 
interests. 
2. Synthetic Jurisdictions 
Synthetic jurisdictions, by contrast, are created by some institu­
tion in order to serve its purposes. They do not define a prepolitical 
social group, but are instead imposed on groups of people from 
"outside" or "above." In one sense, the group defined by the syn­
thetic jurisdiction is itself created by government. If such groups 
have a "culture" at all, it is an institutional culture, a culture of 
bureaucracy perhaps. Rather than reflecting authenticity, synthetic 
jurisdictions exist for the sake of convenience. In Durkheim's 
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terms, they are Gesellschaft communities.31 A government may 
create a jurisdiction in order to facilitate enforcing the law, collect­
ing taxes, gathering statistical data or providing services. Synthetic 
jurisdictions may have some degree of formal autonomy to make 
decisions and alter arrangements, but such autonomy is granted 
only in order to advance a goal of the central government, such as 
responsiveness to changing circumstances or efficiency. 
Synthetic jurisdictions exist for the convenience of the institu­
tions that they serve. There is no independent reason for their 
existence; hence no one speaks of rights when and if they are al­
tered or eliminated. Nor can one object to them on the basis of 
rights. One may have a rights-based claim against the governmen­
tal institution that created or altered the jurisdiction, but such a 
claim would take the form of an attack on the policy or procedure 
by which subdivisions are created, not an attack on the existence or 
shape of a particular jurisdiction qua jurisdiction. (For instance, 
one might attack redistricting because it is racially discriminatory 
but could not assert a right to any particular district.) 
The synthetic jurisdiction assumes that the individual is the pri­
mary agent in political life and that territory serves strictly instru­
mental purposes. Synthetic territory is fungible. Its occupants are 
mobile and rootless; they are rational profit maximizers and techno­
cratic modern citizens. The group defined by the synthetic jurisdic­
tion has no moral relevance; it is the lonely crowd.32 
The electoral district is perhaps the epitome of the synthetic ju­
risdiction. A synthetic jurisdiction is represented as a territorial 
container of individuals. Hence, electoral districts must be periodi­
cally reapportioned to conform to the equipopulosity requirement. 
Such reapportioning serves political equality because the morally 
significant entity is the individual and not the jurisdiction. Not only 
is it necessary that every citizen's vote be equally weighted, but al­
tering the jurisdiction without her consent is not problematic - cit­
izens understand that the synthetic jurisdiction is the servant of the 
state; it is a medium for the administration of the franchise and 
nothing more. 
3. Thinking Jurisdictionally 
The opposed representations of territorial jurisdiction - "or­
ganic" and "synthetic" - are employed by various actors as argu-
31. See id. 
32. See DAVID RIEsMAN, THE LoNELY CRowo: A STUDY OF THE CHANGING .AMERICAN 
CHARACTER (1950). 
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ments for or against a given controversial action. For instance, a 
jurisdiction may be described as synthetic by someone who wishes 
to change the jurisdiction against the wishes of affected parties, 
while the same jurisdiction may be described as "organic" by those 
who wish to assert "rights" to the jurisdiction. 
The dialogical opposition serves other purposes as well. The 
two poles of the opposition each correspond to a type of political 
identity. The deployment of the organic jurisdiction corresponds 
with the production of the local. The creation of a jurisdiction that 
is understood to be "organic" defines a local community that will 
appear to be distinctive both in itself and in its relationship to the 
territory that defines it. By deploying the organic description, gov­
ernment and other bureaucracies can plausibly define the group oc­
cupying the jurisdiction as a prepolitical social fact, as authentic, 
spontaneous and uncontaminated by government in its composition 
and culture. The rhetorical power of the organic mode encourages 
any group that wishes to establish a jurisdiction to present itself as 
an "organic" social group with distinctive cultural norms and values 
that demand the protection and autonomy that a jurisdiction pro­
vides. The organic jurisdiction safeguards tradition and legacy. 
The deployment of the synthetic description corresponds with 
the regularization of the body politic. By this I mean that the crea­
tion of an avowedly synthetic jurisdiction encourages citizens to un­
derstand themselves as rational and objective utility maximizers 
and to conform to a set of activities that facilitate the free alienabil­
ity of land, individual freedom of action, and geographic and social 
mobility. The synthetic mode tends to devalue claims of incom­
mensurability and uniqueness in favor of fungibility and market ex­
change. Social relations are seen as rationally administered through 
bureaucratic policy and arms length bargains: people can be "made 
whole" for the disruption of settled social expectations, either by 
alternative arrangements of equal value, by offsetting benefits of 
mobility or by cash payments. Those inhabiting the synthetic juris­
diction sacrifice the security that autonomy might provide in favor 
of the freedom of action facilitated by socio-spatial arrangements 
that can change easily to meet new circumstances. The synthetic 
jurisdiction is justified by its instrumental convenience. It stands 
for progress and efficiency. 
At this point I must emphasize that the opposition described 
above is a conceptual distinction between jurisdictions. The opposi­
tion exists in the realm of rhetoric and discourse. It guides our per­
ceptions and our actions, and may be more or less accurate as a 
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way of describing the world. More importantly, .its usefulness may 
depend less on its descriptive accuracy and more on its effectiveness 
as an epistemological filter. The dyad may not describe what we 
experience. Rather, it may influence how we think about what we 
experience. 
There are several tempting but incorrect ways of understanding 
the function of this opposition. Most obviously, one may conclude 
that the opposition is simply an accurate reflection of reality: juris­
dictions are in fact either organic or synthetic, just as people are in 
fact either male or female. This approach must be rejected not be­
cause there is "no such thing" as an organic or a synthetic jurisdic­
tion, but because there are too many ambiguous cases to allow for 
such a sharp bi-polar division. Taking the opposition on its own 
terms, few jurisdictions actually conform to the prototypical de­
scriptions - most are a hybrid of the two. Yet in practice we tend 
to force the actual, messy, ambiguous jurisdictions into the Procrus­
tean bed of one of the two prototypes. In Holt, the city had to be 
either a "political community" or a "mere technique." It is obvious 
that it fit neither model well - that was the problem - yet legal 
discourse had no approach that could take account of that reality. 
Another misleading temptation is to see the opposition as sub­
terfuge, a trick that blinds us to the truth. One might say: "Yes! 
The discourse does not reflect reality; therefore, whenever a juris­
diction is described as synthetic, it may really be organic. Likewise, 
whenever we are told it is organic, look out! It is probably syn­
thetic. The hegemonds will try to undermine real communities by 
describing jurisdictions as synthetic and thereby deny the communi­
ties' control over them. Meanwhile, the elite will set up their own 
jurisdictions for their own sinister purposes and claim that these 
newly minted creations are products of the organic soil, as if the 
Trojan horse were flesh and blood." This way of thinking is equally 
problematic. It accepts the terms of the discursive opposition as 
truth and questions only the motives of the speaker and the accu­
racy of the description. 
The opposition does not simply reflect reality, but neither does 
it create an illusion or a lie. Instead it tells us what to look for, what 
to consider, how to organize our thinking. It constructs reality, not 
in the sense of creating an illusion, but in the sense of acting as a 
lens that sharpens certain features and blurs others. 
At this point, one might think that although the opposition be­
tween synthetic and organic jurisdiction does not describe a pre­
political reality, at least the opposition offers tradeoffs among the 
864 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:843 
effects predictably associated with the two conceptions. But the de­
ployment of this jurisdictional discourse does not have simple, 
straightforward or easily predictable social consequences. It is not 
true that once one has accepted a particular conception, one is 
"committed to its logical consequences." The conceptions do not 
have "logical consequences"; instead they have narrative effects 
that are multiple, malleable and even contradictory. 
For instance, I suggested above that the synthetic conception en­
courages technocracy, mobility and fungibility while the organic 
conception encourages the recognition of "thick" group identities 
that are culturally distinct from larger political and social institu­
tions. It seems to follow that if one accepts that a particular com­
munity is organic, that person is committed to respect its autonomy. 
But the organic community can also be described as one of sev­
eral organic components of a larger unity. Here the organic nature 
of the parts serves to justify the natural unity of the whole and per­
haps the natural subordination of some parts to others. This use of 
the organic jurisdiction is suggested by the root of the word "or­
ganic": organ. Each of the organs of the body is naturally distinct 
from the others, but all are also naturally a part of a larger whole. 
The organs are useful to the whole not despite, but because of their 
distinctiveness. A body could not function with several hearts but 
no lungs. The fact that the organs are distinct in no way suggests 
that they are or should be autonomous. To the contrary, their dis­
tinctiveness is evidence of their interdependence. Organic jurisdic­
tions can be represented as organs of the state, whose very 
distinctiveness is necessary to their function as servants of a larger 
whole. Hence, one might insist on the organic distinctiveness of a 
jurisdiction, not to support its autonomy, but to insure its 
subordination. 
Similarly, we might · imagine that the discursive strategy by 
which a central government would secure its integrity would be to 
insist on the synthetic nature of its component parts: "Each of the 
provinces of the nation are but the creations of the Crown; each is 
normatively inconsequential in and of itself; each exists only to 
serve the nation." But an equally effective centralization tactic 
might be to assert the distinctiveness and uniqueness of its subparts, 
but only in order to subsume them under a greater whole: "Each of 
the provinces of the nation is unique, precious and therefore an in­
dispensable part of the nation; we must control you because your 
uniqueness is necessary to the greater good." 
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As we shall see, this discourse in which communities or territo­
ries are defined as organically distinct but also as parts of a larger 
organic whole is a very common dynamic in the history of 
jurisdiction. 
4. Ideology and Covert Status 
As the Holt case demonstrates, jurisdiction presents a problem 
for liberal ideology. The rights and duties of citizens vary depend­
ing on their membership in a jurisdiction. Yet such disparities are 
not easily justified. Membership in a jurisdiction is not entirely vol­
untary: the community of Holt could not simply elect to become 
residents of Tuscaloosa. Nor are jurisdictional distinctions obvi­
ously justified on other grounds. As the Holt.court admits, jurisdic­
tional lines are "arbitrary."33 Therefore, jurisdictions would appear 
to undermine liberty, equality and justice . .Jurisdictional distinc­
tions seem no more just than distinctions based on accident of birth; 
the established right of residency seems no better than the divine 
right of kings. In a sense, jurisdictional distinctions are simply a 
different form of these more obvious status distinctions. 
The dialogical opposition between organic and synthetic juris­
dictions serves an important ideological function in this context. 
Recall that each pole of the opposition suggests a distinct and oppo­
site relationship to government, bureaucracy and the state. The or­
ganic jurisdiction is defined as prepolitical. It is the codification of 
a relationship between people and soil that precedes centralized 
government or state planning. If the organic jurisdiction creates in­
equalities, these inequalities can and perhaps must be tolerated be­
cause they are not created by the state; instead they are the product 
of nature. Nature need not exclude human agency - here, nature 
is opposed not to man, but to artifice or to government. A concern 
for individual liberty and a respect for nature come together in the 
idea of a "human nature" that political institutions must respect. 
For instance, the rural town is often described as something that 
occurs without state intervention. It reflects nature - a natural 
communion of people who work a common soil and rely on each 
other. Perhaps it is natural for people of "like minds" to gather 
together, so the decision of people of one religion or one ethnic 
group to form an exclusive community is also "natural" because it 
reflects "human nature." Even if such jurisdictional divisions pro-
33. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60,_(1978). 
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duce inequalities that are normatively troubling, the inequalities ap­
pear inevitable. 
The synthetic jurisdiction, by contrast, is the product of govern­
ment; it is created with governmental policy in mind. It does not 
have the justification of nature but, instead, the justification of neu­
trality. According to the conventional alibi, the synthetic jurisdic­
tion does not create significant social divisions. It is simply the 
medium for the administration of some policy of central govern­
ment. This is how the Holt majority treated Tuscaloosa: the bound­
aries were beyond justification, they were as just as a lottery. The 
synthetic jurisdiction does not reflect systematic bias but rather 
good and bad luck: "We had to draw the line somewhere." More­
over, because the jurisdiction is synthetic it can, by definition, al­
ways be described as normatively inconsequential so long as its 
opponents have recourse to the government that created it. 
As long as the two poles of the opposition describe all of reality, 
territorial jurisdiction is not normatively problematic. If all impor­
tant jurisdictions are organic and therefore natural and all artificial 
jurisdictions are synthetic and therefore inconsequential or at least 
perfectly random, then jurisdiction does not create a new form of 
status inequality or hierarchy. But if the opposition does not hold 
- if many jurisdictions fall between the two poles - then the spec­
tre of jurisdiction as involuntary status reemerges. By presenting a 
world in which all jurisdictions cluster at one of the two poles, the 
dialogical opposition forecloses the possibility that jurisdiction cre­
ates a type of involuntary status. 
This dialogical opposition between organic and synthetic juris­
dictional "types" is a central feature of modern jurisdiction. It is 
impossible to sever the dialogical representation of jurisdiction 
from its material consequences. As the historical examples in Part 
II will show, a central and indispensable feature of jurisdiction is its 
ideological function. 
II. A HISTORY OF JURISDICTION 
This section will develop three hypotheses about territorial 
jurisdiction. 
First hypothesis: Jurisdiction is not an ahistorical fixture of 
political organization. Territorial jurisdiction may appear to be as 
natural and inevitable as the ground we stand on, a natural out­
growth of the very existence of government. But instead, the emer­
gence of jurisdiction is the product of the coincidence of two 
innovations, one technological - the science of cartography - and 
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one normative - the ideology of rational, humanist government. 
Each development was necessary. Cartography created the concep­
tual space of jurisdiction, while the aspirations of rational govern­
ment provided the incentive to direct the ordering potential of the 
map inward - toward national consolidation and the administra­
tion of government - as well as outward - toward defense and 
conquest. Therefore we can speak of jurisdiction as a technology 
that was "invented" or "introduced" in a given social setting at a 
particular time. 
Second hypothesis: We can tie certain historical developments 
in the art of government to the availability of jurisdiction as a tool, 
just as we can tie certain developments in the art of war to the avail­
ability of gunpowder. When jurisdiction emerged, it advanced a set 
of identifiable social projects. It disrupted existing social relations 
based on personal status and replaced them with a set of social rela­
tionships based on territorial location. To use the terms of private 
law, it initiated a shift from statuses in gross or in personam to sta­
tuses bound to political territory. Further, jurisdiction produced a 
new set of governmental institutions and helped to construct a type 
of political subjectivity that was amenable to a new and more com­
prehensive form of institutional knowledge, management and 
control. 
Third hypothesis: Centralization of power and jurisdictional 
subdivision are not antithetical. Territorial jurisdiction was 
deployed through a rhetorical strategy that described some territo­
ries as simply administrative districts - in other words, synthetic 
jurisdictions - and described others as the territories of distinctive 
social groups - in other words, organic jurisdictions. Both descrip­
tions were indispensable and both were used by a number of differ­
ent social actors with different normative aspirations and practical 
projects. The emerging national governments needed to assert the 
sameness and uniformity of all their subjects and therefore 
deployed the synthetic description to downplay regional or local 
difference. But at the same time they needed to emphasize local 
distinctiveness because such distinctiveness helped to distinguish 
one nation from another. They used the organic description for this 
purpose. Meanwhile local elites needed to become part of the na­
tional system in order to avoid being eliminated altogether by supe­
rior national powers. But at the same time they needed to assert 
their distinctiveness in order to avoid complete assimilation by na­
tional bureaucracies. Thus both national and local elites oscillated 
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between the synthetic and organic conception of sub-national 
jurisdictions. 
These are historically specific hypotheses, not claims of a uni­
versal social "logic." Below are several historical examples that 
lend support to these hypotheses. Of course, there are many histor­
ical contexts that I have not addressed. These hypotheses are 
designed to inaugurate a long-term, systematic study of jurisdiction. 
What follows is only a modest beginning of an ambitious project. 
A. From Status to Locus 
Nineteenth-century Thailand, then called Siam by English 
speakers, provides a striking illustration of the historical emergence 
of jurisdiction. The history of Thailand is one of rapid transition 
from a non-bounded, fluid and ambiguous notion of territory to a 
system of strictly delimited and objectively defined national and 
sub-national jurisdictions. 
The Thai example is convenient because of an especially sophis­
ticated and detailed study of the history of Thai national geography 
produced by Thongchai Winichakul.34 According to Winichakul, 
the Thai state did not develop a concept of territorial jurisdiction 
until the latter part of the nineteenth century. Until then, Siam had 
none of the characteristics of jurisdictional authority. It did not 
control a contiguous territory defined by fixed and objective bor­
ders. Instead, it controlled a set of specific, non-adjacent places ac­
cording to their proximity and usefulness to Bangkok; it controlled 
specific resources, trade routes or populations. It did not conceive 
of its authority in terms of territory. Instead, political authority op­
erated by status hierarchy, with the elites in Bangkok at the top and 
various minor rulers occupying tiers in a dynastic pyramid. Hierar­
chical relations between various rulers and subjects, not control 
over continuous territory, defined Siam. 
In the existing system of provincial control, which was based on the 
hierarchical network of lordship among local rulers under the nobles 
in Bangkok, a small town could request a change of dependence on 
one lord to another . . . . The new lord might be the ruler of a town 
which was not adjacent to it. The domain of a regional lord could 
even be discontinuous.35 
Territory that was neither occupied nor the source of valuable 
resources was simply not "claimed" by any authority - in effect, 
there was nothing to rule. Even the border between the bitter ene-
34. See WINICHAKUL, supra note 25. 
35. Id. at 120. 
February 1999] Law's Territory 869 
mies Siam and Burma was not sharply defined in areal terms. 
"[B]oth sides regarded the [border] towns as rich sources of food 
and manpower for fighting . . . .  "36 Boundaries were defined by 
concrete landmarks or in narrative terms rather than in the abstract 
cartographic terms of a coordinate grid. As a result, boundaries 
were not thin demarcating lines but rather substantial regions or 
zones. Moreover, boundaries were indeterminate, even potentially 
mobile: "[One] boundary was identified . . .  by teak forests, moun­
tains upon mountains, muddy ponds where there were three pago­
das, Maprang trees, three piles of stones, the space between the 
White Elephant (?) and the Nong River . . . .  "37 
This state of affairs persisted until the end of the nineteenth cen­
tury when Siamese rulers began to negotiate with the British and 
French colonial powers, who insisted on definite jurisdictional 
boundaries. In the course of negotiation and conflict with the Eu­
ropean colonial powers, the Bangkok elites came to understand 
that political territorialism was a powerful tool. The map set the 
terms of negotiation and of conflict; cartography became the very 
language in which power and resources were described.38 As the 
significance of the geographical border grew for the rulers in 
Bangkok, the regime supplanted its narrative, concrete understand­
ing of its realm with a jurisdictional one. " [T]he transition from a 
time when the frontier towns were known by name to a time when 
they were known by a map . . . .  took place in a rather short period: 
the final two decades of the nineteenth century."39 
Bangkok needed territorial control and coherence, in order 
both to guard against external threats and to serve the internal 
needs of a rapidly modernizing society. Externally, the British in­
sisted on a strict demarcation and centralization of authority in or­
der to negotiate binding trade agreements,40 while the French 
threatened to take control of ambiguously held. towns in the north­
ern Mekong region by force.41 As the Siamese elites employed 
European cartographic technologies they increasingly understood 
their government in jurisdictional terms: 
36. Id. at 62. 
37. Id. at 70. 
38. See id. at 129 ("[Modem cartography was] a new geographical 'language' by which 
information originated and the new notion of the realm of Siam was conceived. It became a 
framework for thinking, imagining, and projecting the desired realm."). 
39. Id. at 119-20. 
40. See Peter Vandergeest & Nancy Lee Peluso, Territorialization and state power in Thai­
land, 24 THEORY AND SOCIETY 385, 396 {1995). 
41. See WINICHAKUL, supra note 25, at 109-12, 121. 
870 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:843 
For the first time the [Thai] regime was attempting to know the units 
which comprised the realm in territorial terms. Undoubtedly, this was 
a consequence of the new vision created by the modem geographical 
discourse of mapping. Mapping was both a cognitive paradigm and a 
practical means of the new administration. It demanded the reorgani­
zation and redistribution of space to suit the new exercise of adminis­
trative power on a territorial basis.42 
The Siamese elites remade the regime, changing it from a state 
based on an aspatial network of local rulers linked to their subjects 
and to the center (Bangkok) by status obligations, to a government 
organized by technical expertise and by mapped territory.43 The 
birth and hardening of the Siamese administrative state followed 
hard on the heels of the first comprehensive survey and definitive 
mapping of Siamese territory. The abstract space created by mod­
ern cartography, what we will call territorial jurisdiction, was the 
midwife of the administrative state. 
Although this may be difficult for modern readers to grasp, 
before the modern map an areal conception of space simply did not 
exist - instead one had this or that village, trade route, forest, rice 
field. There was no representation of these various specific entities 
that would allow for grouping them together into regions. At the 
same time, typological administration was impractical due to the 
distance between things of the same type - several days journey 
might separate two villages or two rice fields - and because with­
out a synoptic conception of space, there was no way to coordinate 
the administration of things of similar type. The emergence of an 
abstract, mapped conception of the national space facilitated the 
reorganization of the state along both territorial and functional 
lines. 
Once the nation was mapped, it was divided into regions which 
could be administered by agents of the state who reported back to 
Bangkok.44 The sharing of information that resulted allowed for 
functional specialization, a governmental division of labor.45 
Further, territorial administration facilitated the collection of 
revenue in money form or in goods rather than in labor obligations. 
42. Id. at 120. 
43. See id. ("[T]he whole country began to shift from the traditional hierarchical relation­
ships of rulers to the new administration on a territorial basis."); Vandergeest & Peluso, 
supra note 40, at 398. 
44. See WINICHAKUL, supra note 25, at 398-99. 
45. See Vandergeest & Peluso, supra note 40, at 398 ("Bangkok ministries were reorga­
nized by functional specialization . . .  the Ministry of Interior and . . .  the Ministry of Finance. 
New functional Ministries (Agriculture, Education, Defense, Public Works, and others) were 
also created."). 
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This allowed Bangkok to participate more effectively in trade as 
well as to eliminate the last vestiges of the older system of pa­
tronage obligations. Local elites, once referred to with honorific 
titles denoting status were transformed into positions such as "the 
commander protecting territorial integrity."46 In this way the re­
gime transformed itself into a modern, administrative state defined 
by territorial boundaries and organized by functional divisions: 
Income from [trade] monopolies and tax farms allowed the monarchy 
to eliminate its reliance on serf obligations and slavery [incidents of 
the older system of patronage and status rule] almost entir,ely .. . .  
The monarchy in effect transformed layers of nobles and local lords 
into salaried officials. Bangkok ministries were reorganized by func­
tional specialization ... . the principalities outside of Bangkok were 
incorporated into the administrative hierarchy of the Ministry of the 
Interior. The lords of the principalities were displaced by provincial 
governors who took over local administration.47 
Although "[t]he tempo, tactics, problems, and solutions varied from 
place to place . . . .  the final outcomes were the same: the control of 
revenue, taxes, budgets, education, the judicial system, and other 
administrative functions by Bangkok . . . .  "48 Modern cartography 
thus ushered in a new type of government, an administrative state 
animated by the ideals of synoptic knowledge and competent man­
agement of its domain. 
This new government was both more centralized and more dif­
ferentiated than its predecessor. More centralized because it at­
tempted to centralize detailed knowledge of its territorial attributes 
through surveying and mapping. More differentiated because, for 
the first time, it created sharply delineated territorial subdivisions in 
order to organize the collection of data and the administration of 
state policy. 
In order to create a territorial identity the Thai government de­
scribed its tributaries as parts of Thailand rather than as allies, affili­
ates or even subordinates. For example, during the late 1880s, in 
the midst of territorial conflict with colonial France, Bangkok 
sought to establish a sovereign relationship over its loosely allied 
tributaries in the Lao region. In order to secure the loyalty of the 
tributaries, the Thai government, for perhaps the first time, asserted 
a territorial and racial identity - one that included the Thai and its 
tributaries but excluded the Europeans. 
46. See WINICHAKUL, supra note 25, at 106. 
47. Vandergeest & Peluso, supra note 40, at 398. 
48. WINICHAKUL, supra note 25, at 102. 
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[T]he Thai and Lao belong to the same soil. . . .  France is merely an 
alien who looks down on the Lao race as savage . . . .  Although the 
Lao people habitually regard Lao as We and Thai as They when only 
the two people are considered, comparing the Thai and the French, 
however, it would be natural that they regard the Thai as We and the 
French as They.49 
In the next phase of jurisdictional metamorphosis the Thai gov­
ernmental elites reinterpreted the local identities as attributes of a 
' larger national identity, as organs of the territorial state or, in 
Winichakul's terms, "geo-body."50 As Winichakul notes: "[T]he 
losers [in the process of territorialization] were those tiny 
chiefdoms along the routes of both the Siamese and the French 
forces. Not only were they conquered . . .  but they were also trans­
formed into integral parts of the new political space defined by the 
new notions of sovereignty and boundary."51 Although the tributa­
ries were subordinated to Bangkok, they were also given a territo­
rial identity they had not known before. Territorial jurisdiction 
transformed political relationships from a logic of status to one of 
location. 
In Thailand, the birth of jurisdiction was the birth of synoptic, 
universal planning initiated by centralized government and carried 
out through jurisdictional division. It was also the birth of local ter­
ritorialism accomplished through bureaucratically recorded and ty­
pologized territorial "localities." The ultimate result was a 
transformation to a new type of political subjectivity: Siam became 
Thailand. 
B. Nation as Empire: The Mapping of Europa 
Until at earliest the tenth or eleventh century and perhaps as 
late as the fifteenth century, European conceptions of political 
space were much like those of pre-modern Siam. Space was under­
stood only in concrete terms or in relation to the plan of the divine. 
In pre-modern Europe, what appear to modern eyes to be territo­
rial communities were in fact simply groups united by kinship, com­
mon interests and customs. As Sir Henry Maine notes: 
[T]he double proposition that "sovereignty is territorial," i.e. that it is 
always associated with the proprietorship of a limited portion of the 
earth's surface, and that sovereigns inter se are to be deemed not par­
amount, but absolute owners of the state's territory [is assumed to be] 
49. Id. (translating CHIRAPORN SATHAPANAWATIHANA, WIKRITrAKAN 411-12) (first al­
teration in original). 
50. Id. at 129-40. 
51. Id. at 129. 
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founded on principles of equity and common . .  sense . . .  capable of 
being readily reasoned out in every stage of modem civilisation [sic]. 
But this assumption . . .  is altogether untenable so far as regards a 
large part of modem history . . . .  It is . . .  not true that the territorial 
character of sovereignty was always recognised [sic] . . . .  52 
Instead, Maine asserts, early modem European sovereignty was 
split into two conceptions, neither territorial. On the one hand, 
there was what Maine calls "tribe sovereignty"53 practiced by no­
madic peoples. These groups "based no claim of right upon the fact 
of territorial possession, and indeed attached no importance to it 
whatever."54 Instead, the ruler of a nation was king of a people, not 
a territory. On the other hand, a ruler with greater ambitions 
would claim imperial or universal dominion: "[T]he precedent 
which suggested itself for his adoption was the domination of the 
Emperors of Rome . . . .  The chieftain who would no longer call 
himself King of the tribe must claim to be Emperor of the world."55 
Modem territorial sovereignty was an offshoot of feudalism. 
With the accession of the Capetian dynasty in France,56 the title of 
the sovereign evolved from King of the Franks (a people) to King of 
France (the territory).57 At that point, the sovereign stood "in the 
same relation to the soil of France as the baron to his estate, the 
tenant to his freehold . . . .  "58 In England, the Norman conquerors 
imitated their Frankish cousins and initiated the first truly territo­
rial sovereignty in that area. According to Maine, "[e]very subse­
quent [European] dominion which was established or consolidated 
was formed on the latter [territorial] model."59 
Territorial sovereignty had to await the arrival of its technologi­
cal midwife, modem cartography. Although cartography in ancient 
civilizations may have been fairly sophisticated, modem scientific 
cartography was not practiced in Europe until, at earliest, the fif­
teenth century. Some system of coordinate geography and carto­
graphic projection was developed by the celebrated ancient Greek 
astronomer Ptolemy, but it is not clear that Ptolemy himself pro­
duced maps. Neither is it clear how much of the work attributed to 
52. MAINE, supra note 6, at 98-99. 
53. Id. at 100. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 101. 
56. The Capetian dynasty ruled France from 987-1328. See 9 ENCYCLOPreDIA BRITAN- · 
NICA 702 {1970). 
57. See MAINE, supra note 6, at 103-04. See also 9 ENCYCLOPreDIA BRITANNICA 702-03. 
58. MAINE, supra note 6, at 103-04. 
59. Id. at 104. 
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Ptolemy was in reality the innovation of the Byzantine scholars who 
preserved and published his work until the closing years of their 
Empire.60 Although ancient Rome must have produced maps for 
practical endeavors such as travel, conquest and the cultivation of 
land, surviving maps are not drawn to a consistent scale and do not 
conform to a system of coordinates or to the rules of any geometric 
projection.61 Even after the capture of Greece, it appears that the 
Romans had little regard for Greek intellectual accomplishments in 
cartography.62 
0 
In any event, much of ancient cartography, like much of the 
knowledge of the ancients in general, was lost to the West during 
the middle ages. Medieval world maps depicted the world as a fiat 
disc crude�y divided into climatological zones or continents. They 
contained little or no detail and did not even aspire to topograph­
ical accuracy. Other medieval maps of smaller areas were of two 
types. The strip map recorded the distances between various points 
on a route; it depicted the route as a straight line, ignoring direc­
tional orientation. The cadastral map63 defined the extent of settled 
or cultivated land, although surveys of settled land were generally 
recorded in prose form until well into the fourteenth century. 
The earliest known English example of a pictorial map of terri­
tory was drawn in about 1300. Medieval maps were crude and pic­
torial by modern standards; the surveyor's tools consisted of a 
measuring rod, or "metewand," and a device for laying off right 
angles. Maps did not depict territory according to geometric princi­
ples or consistent scale; instead they were drawn in perspective or 
bird's eye view, and conspicuous objects such as buildings were 
drawn in elevation. 64 
Before the fifteenth century there were few maps of entire 
countries. European seafarers developed fairly accurate portolan 
charts by the early fourteenth century, but these charts depicted 
only coastal outlines in significant detail, and they had no grid of 
longitude and latitude. Instead they were developed by measuring 
the distance between two points and the direction one must sail to 
60. See LEO BAGROW, HISTORY OF CARTOGRAPHY 33-34 (1964). 
61. See id. at 37-38. 
62. See id. at 38. 
63. The cadastral map served to designate taxable land holdings in order to facilitate tax 
collection. See JAMES C. ScoTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IM­
PROVE THE HUMAN CoNomoN HAVE FAILED 3, 24 (1998). 
64. See id. at 143. 
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move between them. The portolan charts were graphic depictions 
of " 'catalogue[ s] of directions to follow between notable points.' "65 
In short, the types of maps prevalent in the pre-modem and 
early modem eras were not conducive to the creation of territorial 
jurisdictions. Road maps and itineraries depicted distances be­
tween points and in some cases direction. They did not depict terri­
tory. Cadastral maps depicted territory, but only relatively small 
territories. They used crude techniques of measurement that could 
not be compared easily to surveys conducted at other times and in 
other places. Tue inaccuracies of such surveying techniques were 
tolerable where small areas were concerned and in a context in 
which memory and custom could supplement the survey. But those 
same inaccuracies would be compounded exponentially if larger 
territories were mapped, an undertaking that would require the co­
ordination and compilation of multiple surveys. 
The cartographic grid was introduced to Europe in the four­
teenth century when the ancient Greek manuscript Ptolemy's 
Geographia came to Italy after the fall of Byzantium.66 The system 
of longitude and latitude was refined resulting in ever more accu­
rate and detailed maps. The development of modem cartography 
- and territorial jurisdiction - was thereafter marked by steady 
progress and periodic milestones. 
The first comprehensive national survey was completed in 
France in 1789. It took 121 years to complete and entailed the com­
pilation of a network of 400 surveys that encompassed the entire 
country.67 
1. The French Connection: Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite 
The Thai example illustrated the conditions and consequences 
of the birth of jurisdiction. The study of revolutionary era France 
will illustrate the development of jurisdiction in a thoroughly cen­
tralized national government. Moreover, the French case exempli­
fies the link between normative political ideology and jurisdictional 
development. France, more than any other European nation, lays 
bare the collision of cartography and political ideology that pro­
duced the modem jurisdiction. Unlike the Thai history presented 
65. David Turnbull, Cartography and Science in Early Modem Europe: Mapping the 
Construction of Knowledge Spaces, 48 lMAoo MUNDI 5, 10 (1996) (quoting MICHEL MoLLAT 
DU JouRDIN & MoNIQUE DE LA RoNc!:ERE, SEA CHARTS oF THE EARLY EXPLORERS: 13TII 
TO 17TII CENTURY (1984)) (alteration in original). 
66. See BAGROW, supra note 60, at 77. But see Turnbull, supra note 65, at 14 (asserting 
that the Geographia reached Europe in the thirteenth century). 
67. See Turnbull, supra note 65, at 14-18. 
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above, what follows may be understood as the transformation of 
jurisdiction, rather than its birth. But alternatively, it is the birth of 
a modern, technocratic and ideologically laden jurisdiction. 
France is also exemplary, if not unique, because of the popular 
association of centralization with the development of its national 
institutions. For most observers, the French nation-state epitomizes 
a modern trend toward the centralization of political power. In­
deed, in an elite Encyclopedia under the entry for France, we find 
the following astonishing statement: "The whole history of France 
is a movement toward centralization and unification."68 Nothing in 
this section will challenge this conventional view, but it will suggest 
that even in France, centralization of power and culture was accom­
plished in surprising, perhaps even paradoxical, ways. Here, as in 
Siam, the centralization of power also intensified local territorial­
ism. The assertion of local territorial distinctiveness did not, in the 
end, undermine ;French centralization. In fact, local territorialism 
seems to have been a by-product of comprehensive centralization. 
French cartographers of the late 1600s and 1700s performed the 
first scientific national map surveys, employing geometrical meth­
ods to produce geodetically accurate maps. The national survey 
was a huge undertaking, requiring the coordination and compila­
tion of hundreds of individual surveys. French scientists, bureau­
crats and governmental officials were fascinated with accuracy, not 
only in service of the enlightenment ideal of truth, but also for spe­
cific administrative and political purposes. Geodetically accurate 
maps allowed for coordinated infrastructural projects performed si­
multaneously in different regions of the French territorial 
"hexagon." 
The obsession with geodetic accuracy elevated certain truths at 
the expense of others. The early scientific maps emphasized the 
metrical properties of abstract space while suppressing the "detail" 
of topographical texture and local settlement. "The abstract quality 
of the maps, therefore, desacralized space and [therefore] deper­
sonalized society."69 
The image of France as an empty and homogeneous space ap­
pears to have influenced revolutionary jurisdictional reform. A 
proposal for a new system of administrative jurisdictions, which 
called for the creation of ninety jurisdictions of equal area, was in­
fluenced by the national survey maps of the early eighteenth cen-
68. 9 ENCYCLOPreDIA BRITANNICA 697 (1970). 
69. Josef W. Konvitz, The Nation-state, Paris and Cartography in Eighteenth- and Nine­
teenth-Century France, 16 J. OF HIST. GEo. 3, 4 (1990). 
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tury.70 The new jurisdictional arrangement was to serve several 
revolutionary and ideological purposes. Liberte: the new jurisdic­
tions would facilitate the uniformly correct application of law 
throughout the nation, subordinating local prejudice, hierarchy and 
oppression to nationally guaranteed ideals. Egalite: the new juris­
dictional map superseded local differences and customary law. The 
new divisions, unlike the old, were neutral, homogeneous and egali­
tarian. Fratemite: the new territorial divisions would not threaten 
to fracture into autonomous entities, and they would suppress the 
older divisions that might so threaten. Answering to the metropole, 
the administrative deputies would apply metropolitan justice. 
Therefore "the redrawing of France's administrative boundaries 
was a moral act inspired by and symbolizing the highest political 
ideals; it reified the unity of the nation and of civic virtue."71 
Alas, the lofty ideals of the revolution had to negotiate with the 
legacy of the ancien regime on the ground. Ultimately, eighty-three 
jurisdictional departments were created, and a variety of criteria 
were considered, including respect for topographical features and 
prerevolutionary units. But the end result bears more than an acci­
dental resemblance to the earlier proposal. 
The French creation of territorial departments served to unify 
the nation-state, just as conventional history insists. But this unifi­
cation paradoxically also hardened local differences. It transformed 
vague, fluctuating and discontinuous ethnic settlements into territo­
rially precise regions and provinces. It presented as a unified and 
territorially bounded local culture what had been at best the loosely 
similar and in some cases quite dissimilar practices of numerous ru-
ral villages. 
-
Consider, for example, the famous national effort to displace lo­
cal languages with French. To be sure, the typical story of govern­
mentally imposed uniformity is true. The government of the First 
Republic was concerned about ideological effects of linguistic 
fragmentation: 
"Reaction speaks Bas-Breton" insisted the Jacobins. "The unity of 
the Republic demands the unity of speech . . . . Speech must be one, 
like the Republic." [Others] called for the elimination of "the diver­
sity of primitive idioms that extended the infancy of reason and pro­
longed obsolescent prejudices."72 
70. See id. at 4-5. 
71. Id. at 6. 
72. EUGEN WEBER, PEASANTS INTO FRENCHMEN: THE MODERNIZATION OF RURAL 
FRANCE, 1870-1914, at 73 {1976). 
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Until the Third Republic, however, the French government was 
unable to develop an effective policy to promote linguistic unity. 
As late as 1891, the Minister of the Interior feared that local dialect 
"may endanger French unity."73 In the late nineteenth century "fa­
miliarity with French in the countryside was still cause for com­
ment. . . . In 1879 a folklorist could still publish a parable of the 
prodigal son in 88 different patois."74 
Ultimately, French linguistic unity indeed destroyed local cul­
tures and local idioms - the idiosyncratic speech of rural villages 
and towns. But it did not, by and large, displace flourishing re­
gional languages and cultures. Many of the so-called regional lan­
guages that were supposedly destroyed by the hegemony of French 
were, in the late nineteenth century, still in fact collections of mutu­
ally incomprehensible village patois: 
Nor was Breton one tongue, or Limousin, or the so-called langue 
d'Oc [all "regional languages"]. Vannetais was incomprehensible to 
most other Bretons; men from Leon found it hard to understand 
those from Guingamp. The old dialectical world was fragmented in 
the extreme. Dialect might change from one valley to another, from 
high ground to low, from one riverbank to the next, if physical barri­
ers made communications difficult.75 
Organic, day-to-day social connections gave rise to local dialects, 
not regional languages. The conception of a bounded territorial re­
gion itself, much less of a regional language or culture, was in a 
sense a product of the national project of self knowledge accom­
plished through the census and the map. The government of the 
Third Republic tracked and typologized the language patterns of its 
citizens in terms of the jurisdictional departments developed just af­
ter the revolution.76 The grouping together of these myriad local 
73. See id. at 74, 301-38. 
74. Id. at 75-76. Compulsory education under the Third Republic is commonly and 
rightly credited with the rapid advance in French literacy at the expense of the local dialects. 
But other, less programmatic factors facilitated the nationalization effort, most notably the 
simple fact that the provinces were no longer isolated from each other. Improved highways, 
industrialization, national publications and national institutions such as the military brought 
people from previously isolated villages into contact with each other. See id. at 301-38. 
These social interactions required the diverse population to abandon local dialects: "French 
had to be used as a lingua franca." Id. at 78. 
The local dialects were indeed "organic": they were part of the historical practice of 
people in their day to day lives. But so was the shift to French, a shift that could not have 
occurred through state coercion alone. "The factors that worked against French in the old 
isolated world, self-sufficient in far more realms than mere subsistence, turned against local 
idioms as that world changed. [A local dialect] was useless beyond a certain area that had 
once seemed vast but became increasingly limited in the perspective of the modem world." 
Id. at 86. 
75. Id. at 86. 
76. See id. at 75-77. 
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dialects into regional languages is an act of intellectual interpreta­
tion, the work of cartographers and lexicographers, not nature or 
history.77 The languages that "belonged" to these regions were also 
projections which gave a diversity of local practices a common pedi­
gree they neither earned nor desired. Intellectuals and activists re­
acting to the Third Republic's project of centralization created 
regional literary traditions when for centuries there had been only 
the spoken patois of rural life, different from village to village: 
In 1854 a group of young poets and intellectuals concerned for the 
preservation of the speech and literature of Oc founded the Felibrige 
. . . . To revivify their native language, the Felibres sought to create a 
literature. But literature needs a reading public, and such a public 
was hard to find. The country people, when they learned to read, 
learned to read in French . . . . Furthermore, people who used forms 
of speech that were highly localized and in constant evolution found it 
hard to understand a literary language that was often archaic . . . . 
[The Felibres] address[ed] country people in literary Proven�al and 
[were] met with uncomprehending stares. 
In fact, the Felibrige seems to have been a political reaction initi­
ated on a plane several removes away from ordinary people, and from 
their concems.78 
Of course Provern;al did exist; it was spoken and written in what 
is now Southern France as early as the twelfth century. But by the 
fourteenth century it had fragmented into a multitude of local dia-
77. To be sure, the lexicographers were describing something when they catalogued 
French regional languages. Most notably, there was a linguistic divide between northern 
France and the Midi (south). The Midi - which was thoroughly Romanized earlier than the 
rest of Gaul and was less affected by Germanic and Frankish influences in the Middle Ages 
- developed dialects that remained closer to Latin than those of Northern France. This is 
responsible for the linguistic split between northern French and the langue d'oc ("oc" being 
the term for "yes" in the Midi dialects, as compared to "oil" and later "oui" in the north). 
The term "Provenyal," or "langue d'oc," is used in two separate ways, often conflated. In 
strictly linguistic terms, it refers to all of the southern dialects which retain the greater Latin 
influence. Provenyal is co=only divided into at least three broad languages: Provenyal 
proper, Auvergnat and Limousin, and Gascon. Each of these is in turn divided into scores of 
local dialects. 
In literary terms, Provenyal refers to the standard language of the troubadour poets of the 
twelfth, thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. This literary language was standardized 
and used widely throughout the Midi before the incorporation of that area under Frankish 
rule. But it is doubtful that literary Provenya! - as opposed to local idiom - was ever 
employed as a spoken language beyond a rarefied literary elite. Moreover, literature was 
written and performed in literary Provenyal outside the Midi, in Northern Spain and Italy 
where nobles held it in high esteem. It was less a regional language than an inter-regional 
literary language. In any event, the demise of Provenyal began in the 13th century when war 
ruined the southern nobles who patronized the troubadours - long before the Third Repub­
lic and its project of centralization. Thus long before the eighteenth century, high Provenyal 
was no longer spoken nor written in the Midi: the langue d'oc had become a collection of 
local dialects. See 18 ENCYCLOPreDIA BRITANNICA 680-82 (1970). 
78. WEBER, supra note 72, at 80 (emphasis added). Again, this is not to deny the histori­
cal existence of literary Provenyal. See supra note 77. 
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lects. And it was not a territorial language that competed with and 
was displaced by French, at least not until the nineteenth century. 
The emergence of common languages that were both universally 
written and spoken in territorially bounded regions required the co­
ordination of translations, prohibitions and disciplines on a scale 
that was impossible without the organization of the centralized 
state, the textual multiplication of the Guttenberg press and the 
synopticism of the modem map.79 And we can surmise that the 
world was knowable in terms of bounded regions only after the 
metropolitan project of synoptic mapping. Before the metropole 
and its maps, local culture was experienced "on site" as the culture 
of a certain village settlement. Regions, if they were conceived of 
at all, blurred at the margins, one into another. 
The limited regionalism of nineteenth century France can be 
seen as a kind of failed nationalism. It mirrored the nationalist 
strategy of producing a synthetic homogeneity within a precise, 
mapped territory. The threat of a very real centralization project 
produced a reaction in the form of a "defense of the local." This 
reaction was itself thoroughly caught up in the metropolitan dis­
course of the map. The guardians of local culture did not think, 
perhaps could not think, to defend the local except on the terms 
and with the weapons with which it was being attacked: these were 
territorial terms and territorial weapons. The provinces were led to 
defend, not organic local life but an image of the organic that was 
itself an artifact of the centralization effort they opposed. Far from 
destroying regional culture, centralization in this sense created it. 
2. The British Invasion: Jurisdictional Centralization and the 
Common Law 
The birth of English jurisdiction went hand in glove with the 
consolidation of the English common law. Thus, the history of Eng­
lish jurisdiction illuminates the critical link between territory and 
legal practice that is a defining characteristic of the modern 
jurisdiction. 
Although the common law was said to unify and to some degree 
define England, both historically and territorially, until the seven-
79. See, e.g., BENEDICT .ANDERSON, IMAGINED CoMMUNmES: REFLECTIONS ON THE OR­
IGINS AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM at 40-42, 77-79 (1983). Anderson notes that early mod­
em languages-of-state in Europe were just that: languages used by and for the administrative 
state. There was no attempt to impose them on the subject populations who went on speak­
ing local dialects. There was a systematic attempt to impose national languages in Europe 
only in the 19th century, the same period of time that, according to Anderson, the very idea 
of the nation-state matured. 
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teenth century it did neither. The common law was fractured and 
inconsistent. The common law competed with, and likely borrowed 
from, a collection of other practices: "Roman civil law, canon law 
and a bewildering variety of local customary law."8° This legal cor­
nucopia was not administered by a unified and coordinated system 
of justice but instead by "national, regional and local courts, ecclesi­
astical and secular courts, courts occasional and permanent . . . 
courts of considerable antiquity and courts newly erected or ·as­
serted, courts swamped with business and courts moribund for lack 
of suitors."81 Until the fifteenth century, ecclesiastical courts pre­
sided over matters such as marriage, succession, heresy and any dis­
pute involving a member of the clergy or the property of the 
church. Commercial transactions were administered through sepa­
rate mercantile courts.82 Feudal lords retained the right to hold 
court over their subjects as an incident of property ownership.83 
The legal system was also fractured territorially. The pre­
Norman local divisions of the "shire" and "hundred" not only sur­
vived the Conquest, but also continued to administer justice with 
separate courts of overlapping jurisdiction.84 These were the clos­
est medieval England had to territorial jurisdictions, but they had 
few of the qualities we associate with jurisdictions today. 
Most notably, they did not have definite territorial boundaries. 
Prior to the fifteenth century, modem surveying was not practiced 
in England.85 As a result, maps were schematic rather than geo­
detic. Often the only description of an estate or territory was a 
written narrative.86 Measures were fluid, locally varied and approx­
imate. Land "rights were sometimes marked by the cast of a ham­
mer; the boundary between the shires of · Cambridge and 
Huntingdon ran in some of the meres 'as far a man might reach 
with his barge-pole to the shore'; the day's journey and the morn­
ing's ploughing were other convenient units."87 
80. WILFRID PREST, THE PROFESSIONS IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 65 (1987). 
81. Id. 
82. See 6 ENCYCLOPO:DIA BRITANNICA 163 (1970). 
83. In support of uncontroversial and accepted facts of canonical English history, I will 
cite the account provided in the Encyclopcedia Britannica. See 8 ENCYCLOPO:DIA BRITAN­
NICA 549 (1970). 
84. See NICHOLAS K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER 77-78 
(1994). 
85. See BAGROW, supra note 60, at 143-44, 165. 
86. See id. at 143. 
87. H.C. Darby, The Agrarian Contribution to Surveying in England, 82 GEOGRAPHICAL 
JOURNAL 529, 530 (1933). 
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Many early English towns88 were autonomous entities that were 
not legally recognized at all. During the Norman period, propertied 
lords established towns on their lands in order to take advantage of 
the benefits of commerce.89 In some cases, the lord would obtain a 
royal charter to establish a market and the settlement would fol­
low.90 In other cases, settlers established autonomous institutions 
in the form of guilds which were granted the privilege of regulating 
the important trades and crafts within the cities. The guilds took on 
many of the functions that we associate with government today.91 
Jurisdiction in these localities was an incident of status, property or 
commercial monopoly, not a subdivision of centralized government. 
Even those cities that were formally recognized were not terri­
torial jurisdictions. During the feudal period many cities were col­
lective enterprises92 within the system of feudal estates 
administered by the Crown.93 The medieval borough did not exist 
as a separate entity; it was simply the association of its individual 
burgesses.94 Residence was not a criterion for membership; many 
nonresidents were citizens and most residents were not citizens.95 
Rights to citizenship were hereditary and in some municipal corpo­
rations membership could be purchased.96 
Cities did exercise what we today think of as legal, if not territo­
rial, jurisdiction. They established their own courts, selected jurors 
from their members and elected their own sheriffs. 97 But cities 
were not the only entities to exercise jurisdiction. Since the entity 
exercising jurisdiction was formally an aterritorial corporate group, 
there was no reason that other corporations could not exercise ju-
88. Although there were formal distinctions between cities, towns and villages, these dis­
tinctions changed over time and the terms seem to have been used inconsistently. As a re­
sult, many historical co=entators use the terms interchangeably. 
89. See MAX WEBER, THE CITY 133 (1958); THE ENGLISH MEDIEVAL ToWN: A READER 
IN ENGLISH URBAN HisroRY, 1200-1540, at 5 (Richard Holt & Gervase Rosser eds., 1990) 
[hereinafter MEDIEVAL T oWN]. 
90. See MEDIEVAL TOWN, supra note 89, at 5. 
91. See id. at 9, 12; see also SrR PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS, A LICENSE To TRADE: THE Hrs. 
TORY OF ENGLISH CHARTERED COMPANIES 4-7 {1974). 
92. Terminology can be confusing in this regard. For instance, although practically speak­
ing, municipal corporations may have existed as early as the reign of Edward I {1272-1307), 
the first charter granting incorporation seems to have been issued in 1343. See JENNIFER 
LEVIN, THE CHARTER CoNTROVERSY IN THE CITY OF LoNDON, 1660-1688, AND ITS CONSE­
QUENCES 63 {1969). 
93. See WEBER, supra note 89, at 135. 
94. See LEVIN, supra note 92, at 64. 
95. See WEBER, supra note 89, at 134-35. 
96. See id. at 136. 
97. See id. at 133-34, 135-36. 
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risdiction over territory as well. Jurisdiction was often an attribute 
of the trade monopolies that were common in the mercantile pe­
riod. Because local government evolved from the commercial rela­
tionships of the guilds, the power of sovereignty was understood as 
an incident of the regulation of trade. For example, many of the 
American colonies were established and governed by chartered cor­
porations.98 As late as the 1770s Edmund Burke ·complained that 
the East India Company " 'did not seem to be merely a Company 
formed for the extension of the British commerce, but in reality a 
delegation of the whole power and sovereignty of this kingdom sent 
into the East.' "99 
The centralization of legal authority required imposing a single 
legal system and coordinating territorial jurisdictions. English com­
mon law potentially supplied the former. The word "common" de­
notes not only the customary origins, but also the universality of 
English case law. The ideology that emerged with the Writings of 
Sir Edward Coke in the early seventeenth century presented the 
common law as the unified law of England from "time out of 
mind."100 After his dismissal from the King's Bench in 1616, Coke 
joined the antiroyalists. Largely through his interpretive efforts, the 
common law became a significant source of power that could oper­
ate autonomous of the Tudor Crown and its royally controlled 
courts, such as the chancellor's court of equity and the infamous 
Star Chamber.101 Against the expansion of centralized royal power 
through the "Prerogative Courts," Coke and the common lawyers 
argued for the jurisdiction of the common law. 
But Coke did not favor a return to the decentralized patchwork 
of local courts and courts of specific categorical jurisdiction. Coke 
instead wished to ensure the centralization of legal authority in the 
common law courts. For Coke, the common law defined England 
as a nation; it distinguished the sceptered isle from the continent, 
with its Latin and Justinian codes.102 As such, it had to be both 
distinct from the laws of the continent and also uninterrupted 
within England. It had to either encompass or supersede all local 
98. See generally MICHAEL KAMMEN, EMPIRE AND INTEREST: THE AMERICAN COLONIES 
AND THE PoLmCS OF MERCANTILISM (1970); RUDOLPH ROBERT, CHARTERED COMPANIES 
94-120 (1969). 
99. See GRIFFITHS, supra note 91, at 99 (quoting 5 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF INDIA 
182 (1929)). 
100. See 6 ENCYCLOPO:DIA BRITANNICA at 164 (1970); BLOMLEY, supra note 84, at 73. 
101. See BLOMLEY, supra note 84, at 73, 75-77. 
102. See BLOMLEY, supra note 84, at 74. 
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custom. It had to be conterminous with the history of England, co­
extensive with English territory, and common to all of England.103 
These needs were at loggerheads. On the one hand, the "com­
mon law" that served England since time immemorial was local, 
fragmented and historically discontinuous. It was not uniquely 
English, nor did it encompass all of English practice. Instead, it was 
a bricolage of local customs, autonomous courts, independent legal 
practices and foreign imports. On the other hand, the comprehen­
sive, consistent and conclusive common law that Coke masterfully 
expounded was a creation of the genius of his own era. To be sure, 
Coke's common law drew on the ancient traditions of the shire and 
hundreds courts, the manorial courts and the justice of the citi€:'.S, 
but it necessarily drew on them selectively. Perhaps every part of 
the common law Coke advanced had been practiced somewhere in 
England at some time in its history, but no part was practiced 
everywhere, nor was all of it practiced anywhere. 
In order to establish the comprehensiveness of the common law, 
Coke and the common lawyers had to deny the distinctiveness of 
local institutions and customary law. Yet at the same time they had 
to assert that very distinctiveness in order to give the common law 
the organic connection to England that would distinguish it from 
Roman or Justinian law. The effacing of local custom was there­
fore, "an ambiguous move . . .  the local customs [that were to be 
effaced] . . .  were [also] those that supposedly provided the 'com­
munal' underpinnings to the common law."104 
The contest between the common law and the royal Prerogative 
Courts was not, then, a contest between centralization and decen­
tralization of power, but instead between different projects of cen­
tralization. One project employed the positive authority of the 
Crown to create new institutions. The other sought to assimilate 
the older institutions, rationalizing them and bringing them under a 
comprehensive organization, while at the same time retaining and 
exploiting the legitimacy of their antiquity and organic pedigree. 
The latter strategy produced the more resilient institutions. The 
Prerogative Courts were later abolished and the Chancery, which 
administered the law of equity, only barely survived.105 The asser­
tion of the local and the organic was a part of a successful strategy 
of centralization. 
103. See id. at 75. 
104. Id. at 76. 
105. The chancellor's courts were later absorbed into the common law courts in 1873. See 
6 ENCYCLOP<:eDIA BRITANNICA 165 {1970). 
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The consolidation of English territorial jurisdiction mirrored 
Coke's construction of the common law. In a process remarkably 
similar to the jurisdictional modernization of Siam, the post­
Conquest regimes brought the multiplicity of autonomous institu­
tions into the service of a national government. Pieces of the previ­
ously autonomous institutions were enlisted as organs of the 
centralized nation: 
[M]any local institutions . . .  began to change from an element within 
a localized and relatively autonomous set of legal institutions and 
practices to a component within a national system. They became, for 
the first time, component parts of the "local state," charged with the 
"bottom-up" task of collecting spatial information on crime and disor­
der, and the "top down" task of administering central law . . . .  [T]heir 
new location [was] within a "vertical" system of spatial surveillance 
and administration.106 
Towns and cities first became corporations limited by the terms of 
their charters and, later, simply governmental subdivisions. 
The older territorial institutions were subordinated to the na­
tional government, but they were not always stripped of their uni­
queness. Instead, their distinctive attributes were sometimes used 
to define the identity of English government. For instance, the ma­
jority of the members of the British House of Commons were 
drawn from the "ancient" local boroughs (rather than districts of 
equal population) until 1884.107 Such a recognition of local jurisdic­
tions is commonly seen as an antidote to the power of centralized 
government. But the political recognition of organic jurisdictions 
can also serve as a vehicle for the projects of centralized 
government. 
Consider, for example, the extension of the organic conception 
of jurisdiction found in the English political theorist and statesman 
Edmund Burke's idea of "virtual representation." Until reform in 
the late nineteenth century, representation in the British House of 
Commons was not apportioned according to population. Instead, 
various local jurisdictions had the right to send members. Repre­
sentation was ad hoc. Some cities had representation while others 
did not, and those cities with representation varied greatly in size 
and importance.108 This understandably led to agitation for the ex­
tension of the franchise to the unrepresented towns. Although 
Burke supported the extension of the franchise in some cases, he 
rejected the familiar conception of political representation that 
106. BLOMLEY, supra note 84, at 78. 
107. See 17 ENCYCLOP<:eDIA BRITANNICA 383 (1970). 
108. See id. 
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holds that every citizen must have an equally weighted vote. Ac­
cording to Burke, good parliamentary representation should guar­
antee that all of the interests of the people were represented, not all 
of the people themselves. Burke surmised that any community 
would be well represented in government as long as any representa­
tive shared its interests: "Although the city of Birmingham elects no 
members to Parliament, it can still be virtually represented there 
because Bristol sends members; and these are really representatives 
of the trading interest, of which Birmingham, too, is a part."109 Bir­
mingham would be "virtually represented" by the Bristolite. 
It was unobjectionable, in Burke's scheme, that while Bristol 
and Birmingham "shared" a representative, another jurisdiction 
may have a representative all to itself. It was equally unobjection­
able that another jurisdiction may be far smaller in population and 
yet have the same number of representatives. The entity repre­
sented was to be the jurisdiction, or more precisely, the interest, not 
the individual.110 
One commentator complained that, in Burke's scheme, one did 
not need elections at all. "If a citizen does not need a vote to be 
well represented, why should any citizen have votes?"111 Perhaps 
this criticism is unfair. We may conclude that some actual represen­
tation is necessary to ensure that the popular House has access to, 
and an incentive to act on, accurate information about the needs 
and preferences of the people as a whole.11 2 But one may well ask: 
"Why represent separate jurisdictions?" Burke tacitly assumed an 
organic fusing of territory and a specific, easily defined interest. 
Although Burke envisioned that many jurisdictions could share an 
interest - Bristol and Birmingham are both "trading cities" -
Burke's virtual representation seems to exclude the possibility that 
many interests may compete within one jurisdiction, or that interest 
and jurisdiction may not coincide at all. Since Burke is concerned 
with representing conceptually defined interests - not places -
Burke's representational scheme must consider geography a proxy 
for interest. 
So why assume, as Burke does, that the salient interests are ar­
ranged territorially? Nothing in his idea of virtual representation 
109. See HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 174 (1967). 
110. See, e.g., EDMUND Burum, Letter to Sir Hercules Langrishe, in 4 THE WoRKS OF TIIE 
RIGHT HONORABLE EDMUND Burum 241, 293 (Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 1869) {1792); 
PITKIN, supra note 109, at 174-75; see also SACK, supra note 23, at 131. 
111. Robert M. Hutchins, The Theory of Oligarchy: Edmund Burke, in 5 THE THOMIST 
61, 65 (1943). 
112. Indeed this is Burke's response. See PITKIN, supra note 109, at 177-78. 
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requires the representation of boroughs as boroughs and much 
counsels against it. If it is interests, and not individuals, that are to 
be represented, would it not be better simply to elect a representa­
tive of the particular interest in question - a representative of trad­
ing interests rather than a representative of Bristol who "virtually 
represents" Birmingham? A Burkean may object that we cannot, 
in advance, identify the interests that should be represented. Per­
haps not, but that is precisely what Burke's virtual representation 
requires us to do. How else are we to know which jurisdictions can 
be virtually represented and by whom?113 
In Burke's scheme, the organic jurisdiction functions as a tech­
nique of the central government. Virtual representation does not 
discover the relevant political interests, but instead must define 
them. But geography does serve an important ideological function 
in Burke's scheme: it makes the represented interests appear ob­
jective, natural and hence uncontroversial. Imagine the popular re­
action if, rather than selecting the boroughs to be represented in the 
House of Commons, parliament were to have explicitly decided 
that certain interests were worthy of representation and others were 
not, or that certain interests deserved a greater say than others. Be­
cause the boroughs preexisted Burke's scheme - some were called 
"ancient" - the interests he identified also seemed of ancient pedi­
gree and status. Behind Burke's description of political interests 
lies the implication that a given interest self evidently belongs to a 
given jurisdiction or number of jurisdictions. The subtle suggestion 
that geography itself defines the interests in question makes 
Burke's scheme rhetorically palatable. 
The division of the body politic into organic territorial jurisdic­
tions, then, can be seen as a part of a highly centralized scheme of 
political control - a scheme that recognizes particular interests and 
fails to recognize others and that defines and organizes groups 
through political territories. No matter how well intentioned and 
sincere the attempt to define the interests and their territories, the 
attempt is anything but neutral or apolitical. Similarly, the idea of 
organic jurisdiction - a territorially defined organization that is 
also defined by specific interests - can be a conceptual abstraction 
and a governmental technique, no less so than the abstract space of 
the synthetic grid. 
113. See id. at 174-75. 
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In the divergent national contexts of Thailand, France and Eng­
land the evolution of territorial jurisdiction exhibited some com­
mon features. In all three cases the centralization of power was 
accompanied by the creation of local jurisdictional subdivisions. 
And in each case the national elites seem to have confronted local 
difference with ambivalence. Local difference threatened national 
solidarity. But in some cases the nationalists actually produced and 
emphasized local difference through territorialism. They, like the 
European nationalists described by Thomas Heller, were 
primarily bricolleurs . . . . They pasted together national communities 
from selected bits of the familiar social order and cautious allusions to 
putatively natural distinctions they found in the popular conscious­
ness. The pre-modem nongovernmental order of church, class, guild, 
corporation, and family . . . were defended and established by the 
nation-state as the defining features of national identity. State re­
sources financed their growth and reproduction. State powers were 
delegated to them to assure and, in many cases, increase their contin­
uing relevance . . . .  [T]heir particular roles in governance and the or­
ganization of everyday life were the stuff from which national 
communities of character and obligation were articulated.114 
On the one hand, autonomous local institutions based on expe­
rience and proximity were being replaced with or transformed into 
capillaries of the national government. But at the same time, these 
institutions had to retain certain elements of the local and the or­
ganic. Their surveillance function was more than simply that of the 
spy or imperial mole, an agent who stands apart from what it 
records. Instead, the local jurisdiction bore witness to its own iden­
tity. Rather than surveillance and reporting, the function was that 
of confession and autobiography. 
D. Jurisdiction American Style 
During the past century, local society has become part of a national 
economy; its status and power hierarchies have come to be 
subordinate parts of the larger hierarchies of the nation.115 
It is commonly asserted that American political history is char­
acterized by the progressive centralization of power at the expense 
of locally distinctive political communities such as the states and 
114. Thomas C. Heller, Modernity, Membership, and Multiculturalism, 5:2 STAN. HUMAN. 
REv. 3, 48 (1997). 
115. c. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 39 (1956). 
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local governments.116 Often implicit in this analysis is an under­
standing that territorial control is primarily exercised through ho­
mogenization and the assimilation of local difference. As we have 
seen, the relationship between centralized power and local political 
territorialism was more complicated in other national contexts. The 
same is true in the United States. Of course, a good deal of central­
ization did take place, as the typical view supposes. But centraliza­
tion and the repression of local difference is only part of the story. 
Simultaneously, local difference was being produced and enshrined, 
not only as an act of resistance to centralized power, but also as a 
mechanism of the c�ntralization of power. 
American jurisdictional development differed from that of both 
Thailand and Europe in significant ways. In_ the United States a 
much weaker state bureaucracy and national elite was overshad­
owed in importance by a mobile, free market oriented and cultur­
ally anarchic civil society.117 Communal relationships were 
understood as private rather than as within the domain of the 
state.118 National culture was fractured and national citizenship 
was thin. In this context, the "centralization" of jurisdictional con­
trol entailed the disruption of local communal power in favor of 
individual mobility and the dominance of the private economic 
market. The same American republicanism that rejected the Anglo 
mercantile corporation also distrusted its cousin, the municipal cor­
poration.119 This ideology sought to control local government by 
narrowing its influence on social life and by subordinating it to 
116. This assertion is co=on to many discussions of postwar American society. Ameri­
can federalism and the self-styled "co=unitarian" movement decry the "loss of co=u­
nity" in American society. See, e.g., AMrrAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF CoMMUNITY: RIGHTS, 
REsPONSIBILITIES AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993); RosABETH Moss KANTER, 
COMMITMENT AND CoMMUNITY 169-75 (1972) ("Developing a distinctive culture . . .  is much 
more difficult today than in the nineteenth century.") MILLS, supra note 115; Phillippe Aries, 
The Family and the City in the Old World and the New, in THE CHANGING IMAGES OF THE 
FAMILY 29 (Virginia Tufte & Barbara Myerhoff eds., 1974) (arguing that the city "lost its 
vitality" when the state "wiped out . . .  frontiers" with the result that governmental "scrutiny 
and control extend . • •  into every sphere of activity"). Some authors go further and claim 
that modern society generally is characterized by the centralization of numerous aspects of 
social and political life including the economic (through global capitalism), the cultural 
(through the mass media), and the political (through the national bureaucratic state) realms. 
See, e.g., MANuEL CASTELLS, THE CITY AND THE GRASSROOTS 318-31 (1983). 
117. See, e.g, DUNCAN KENNEDY, Radical Intellectuals in American Culture and Politics or 
My Talk at the Gramsci Institute, in SEXY DRESSING ETc. 1, 19-20; Heller, supra note 114, at 
15-18. 
118. See generally Heller, supra note 114. 
119. See MICHAEL SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S D1scoNTENT 123-50 (1996). Sandel notes 
that cities and European mercantilism were virtually synonymous in the republicanism of 
Madison; the two worked hand in glove and both threatened to erode the civic virtue of the 
American people. Id. at 137. 
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larger units of government with correspondingly thinner social 
commitments. 
1. A Synthetic Social Fabric 
.American jurisdictional development was marked by synthetic 
sub-national jurisdictions. These synthetic jurisdictions served both 
to strengthen the federal government and perhaps more impor­
tantly, to support the homogenizing influence of industrial capital­
ism. Even the states are at times understood as synthetic 
territories. Despite constitutional protections120 and the represen­
tation of states as states in the Senate - suggesting an organic con­
ception in which each state is unique and primary - the states are 
generic in status. The Constitution names no specific states, and 
Article IV, Section 3 allows for the addition of new states, reflecting 
the self-image of a growing, dynamic and mobile nation, a nation of 
Gesellschaft communities and convenient jurisdictions. 
Further evidence of the synthetic nature of American jurisdic­
tions appears iri the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, passed under the 
Articles of Confederation. Based in part on Thomas Jefferson's 
1784 plan for governance of the Western Lands ceded by Virginia 
to the federal Congress, the plan for the Northwest Territories es­
tablished the gnd as the spatial template for jurisdictions: 
[T]he territories in the Northwest were expected to be subdivided ac­
cording to lines parallel to those of longitude and latitude, and these 
were to form components of the states' boundaries when feasible and 
the boundaries for practically all of the county, township, and private 
parcels of land. This rectangular land survey system was to be used 
subsequently through much of the West.121 
This conception of jurisdiction was only possible through the in­
tersection of modern cartography and political liberalism. Without 
the synoptic conception of space provided by the map it would have 
been impossible to anticipate the creation of jurisdictions years 
before any known settlement took place in territory that no English 
speaker had even seen. But more importantly, it would have been 
impossible to conceive of jurisdictions in advance of actual settle­
ment without an abstract and generic conception of jurisdiction, a 
conception in which any jurisdiction can be thought of abstractly, as 
like any other. Generic jurisdictions are not designed to serve spe-
120. See, e.g., U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (states must consent to be divided or merged); 
U.S. CoNST. amend. X (all powers not specifically granted to the federal government are 
reserved to the stat!!s). 
121. SACK, supra note 23, at 150; see also MARK MoNMONIER, DRAWING nm LINE, 
TALES OF MAPS AND CARTOCONTROVERSY 112-15 (1995). 
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cific social groups or further specific local interests. Instead, they 
are designed to serve a mobile population of individuals who will 
form generic and fluid communities, each morally equivalent and 
fungible. Each jurisdiction provides more or less the same services 
and each is in more or less the same relationship to individual citi­
zens and to centralized government. 
In revolutionary France, a proposal to create administrative ju­
risdictions of equal population, as opposed to equal area, was re­
jected on the ground that it would require the constant redrawing 
of districts as the population changed.122 The nameless French ju­
risdictional visionary who advanced the idea would perhaps be grat­
ified to learn that, almost 200 years later, his proposal was adopted 
in the nation that inspired the French revolution. 
Of course I refer to the reapportionment of American congres­
sional districts. The epitome of the synthetic jurisdiction is found in 
territorial divisions designed to facilitate elections. Although noth­
ing in the text of the Constitution requires states to elect their rep­
resentatives through equipopulous electoral jurisdictions, most of 
the original thirteen colonies had strict districting requirements 
designed to equalize population as early as 1780.123 Moreover, the 
Constitution mandates reapportionment of representatives accord­
ing to population every ten years.124 Both of these facts suggest 
that the American conception of jurisdiction was similar to that of 
the French in at least one crucial respect: jurisdiction was designed 
to mediate between the individual citizen and the national govern­
ment and to reflect the principle of individualism and egalitarian­
ism. It was the individual first and foremost that was to be 
represented; the jurisdiction had no moral weight of its own.125 
Although many states had equipopulosity requirements for elec­
toral districts, as the nation grew some states sacrificed equal 
populosity in order to achieve other goals such as the representa­
tion of existing subdivisions and regional interests, and after the en­
franchisement of African Americans, the division or dilution of the 
vote based on race. 
122. See Konvitz, supra note 69, at 6. 
123. See SACK, supra note 23, at 149; D. Lutz, The Theory of Consent in Early State 
Constitutions, 9 PUBLIUS 11, 25 (1979). 
124. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives . . .  shall be apportioned among 
the several states . . .  according to their respective Numbers . . . .  The actual Enumeration 
shall be made . . .  within every subsequent Term of ten Years."). 
125. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1057, 1076 
(1980). 
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At times, these goals led decision makers to produce electoral 
districts of radically unequal size. In the companion cases 
Westberry v. Sanders126 and Reynolds v. Simms, 127 the Court held 
that at least roughly equipopulous congressional districts were re­
quired by Article I, section 2 and by the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Four years later, in Avery v. Midland 
County, 128 the Court held that the equipopulosity requirement ap­
plied to elections held for general purpose municipal governments. 
And in Board of Estimate v. Morris, 129 the Court reinforced its ear­
lier holding, striking down the legislative body that had served the 
five boroughs of New York City since its incorporation on the 
ground that its members were elected from jurisdictions of unequal 
population. 
Board of Estimate v. Morris, one of the latest in the line of "one­
person, one-vote" Supreme Court decisions, is also the most strik­
ing example of the judicial embrace of what one might call the syn­
thetic jurisdictional grid. From 1907 - nine years after the 
incorporation of New York City - until its Court-ordered demise 
in 1989, the Board of Estimate served as the primary legislative 
body in New York City. The Board of Estimate reflected an or­
ganic conception of borough jurisdiction. Composed of one mem­
ber elected from each borough and three city-wide members, it 
allowed each borough member an equally weighted vote, regardless 
of the population of the borough. Morris effectively mandated the 
transformation of greater New York City, from a metropolitan con­
federation government that institutionalized the uniqueness of its 
five constituent boroughs, to a fully consolidated municipality in 
which the boroughs were reduced to inconsequential units of 
convenience. 
These decisions illustrate the synthetic conception of jurisdic­
tion. In each instance, an organic conception of jurisdiction would 
have justified representative jurisdictions of unequal size. Organic 
social groups may vary in size but deserve equal representation as 
groups. Yet in each instance, the Court decided to sacrifice the no­
tion of organic group representation in favor of individually ori­
ented regularization. These decisions rejected the idea that groups 
of unequal population may deserve representation on equal footing 
as groups. They subordinated group representation through or-
126. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
127. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
128. 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
129. 489 U.S. 688 (1989). 
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ganic jurisdictions altogether in favor of the representation of indi­
viduals through convenient jurisdictions. 
This would seem to be strong evidence for the centralization 
narrative. Arguably, one important consequence of the centraliza­
tion of power is the destruction of sub-national affiliations that 
might interfere with fostering national patriotism and the needs of a 
national economy. The synthetic mode of jurisdictional formation 
reflected in reapportionment requires citizens to express their polit­
ical concerns and ambitions in terms of the isolated and autono­
mous subject. Activity as a member of an enduring political 
community or group and even long-term alliances are fractured by 
arbitrary borders that may be periodically redrawn. No affiliation 
is so important that it cannot be destroyed in the next reapportion­
ment. Although it is occasionally recognized that groups, not indi­
viduals, elect representatives and influence public policy,130 the 
synthetic mode of jurisdictional formation endeavors to render such 
groups transitory, ephemeral and random. It seeks to reduce polit­
ical groups and group-based identification with territory to episodic 
occurrences or instrumental tactics. 
In this sense, the synthetic jurisdiction constructs a particular 
type of political subjectivity: a subject whose primary affiliations 
are either much smaller or much larger tlian the local community. 
It encourages privatism - the inward-looking orientation toward 
self, home and immediate family - and nationalism - the 
broader-looking affiliation with the nation. The nation, then, is the 
political entity that the synthetic mode insists is of primary impor­
tance. In short, the synthetic mode discourages affiliations that in­
termediate between the individual (or family) and the state.131 
Moreover, the synthetic jurisdiction regularizes the relationship be­
tween individuals and the central government. By insisting that 
each jurisdiction is morally equivalent, the synthetic mode facilities 
a regular and mechanical administration of policy that need not 
consider the specifics of community or place. 
The "one-person, one-vote" rule reflected more than a simple 
vindication of liberal individualism. It also formalized a strictly syn­
thetic conception of representative jurisdictions, the doctrinal coun­
terpart of a regimented jurisdictional grid. 
Evidence of governmental centralization is also found in the his­
tory of "general purpose" jurisdictions, such as the states and local 
130. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 167 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
131. Accord Frug, supra note 125, at 1076, 1089. 
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governments. From the beginning, many American colonies were 
synthetic jurisdictions, defined by abstract, metrical space. For in­
stance, "[t]he first charter of Virginia . . .  established a jurisdiction 
over a territory carved out by lines of latitude, between 34° and 45° 
North and up to 100 miles off shore."132 Other American charters 
were similarly abstract in their definition of territory. Although 
many charters allowed for experimentation and flexibility in the 
creation of jurisdictional subdivisions (often granting the founder 
absolute power to subdivide as he saw fit), others established elabo­
rate jurisdictional schemes that mapped out subdivisions on paper 
before a single colonist had set foot in the territory.133 For exam­
ple, the 1669 plan for Carolina134 anticipated the revolutionary sub­
division of France in its almost mathematical conceptualization: 
The whole province shall be divided into counties; [forming squares] 
each county shall consist of eight signiories, eight baronies, and four 
precincts; [and] each precinct shall consist of six colonies . . . . Each 
signiory, barony, and colony shall consist of twelve thousand acres . . .  
so that in setting out and planting the lands, the balance of the gov­
ernment may be preserved.135 
Such a comprehensive jurisdictional blueprint was not the only 
possible way to delegate political power. One might have waited 
for actual settlements and empowered them as jurisdictions as they 
emerged and grew. In fact, other colonial jurisdictions did emerge 
in response to organic social settlement. Early New England towns, 
for instance, were closed societies, often comprised of a single reli­
gious group. "The New England town was a parish with civil au­
thority grafted on. "136 Town lands belonged initially to the 
founding settlers, and newcomers had to be approved by the 
townsmen before they could settle in the community and hold land. 
Some towns required that local magistrates approve new settlers, 
others required the blessing of the Church. Most early New Eng­
land towns forbade the sale of land to unapproved outsiders. In 
1636, Boston enacted regulations limiting the stay of guests to four­
teen days unless leave to remain was thereafter granted by local 
officials.137 These requirements were designed to police the mem-
132. SACK, supra note 23, at 134. 
133. See id. at 134-38. 
134. The plan was possibly drafted by John Locke. See id. at 136. 
135. 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND 0TIIBR 
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 2772 (F.N Thorpe ed., 1909), quoted in SACK, supra 
note 23, at 136 (final alteration added). 
136. SACK, S11pra note 23, at 140. 
137. See id. at 141. 
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bership in an organic community. Local groups wished to exclude 
individuals with incompatible beliefs and limit local charity to insid­
ers.138 Accordingly, membership was presumed denied unless ex­
pressly granted. 
As the population of New England grew larger and more mo­
bile, this insular system of local membership became unworkable. 
In order to provide social services for a mobile population and to 
spread the burdens of poverty relief, local governments established 
a presumption in favor of permanent residency for individuals set­
tled in the community for three months. Those individuals not 
"warned out" - discovered and expelled or found to be nuisance 
- would become permanent community members. This presump­
tion was maintained and strengthened in the 1672 Articles of Con­
federation,139 and eventually matured into the contemporary 
constitutional "right to travel" standard which eliminated dura­
tional residency requirements altogether for the receipt of local 
benefits and exercise of the franchise.140 This evolution away from 
local control over residency reflects a profound shift away from a 
conception of organic, concrete, associational jurisdictions to one of 
synthetic, abstract, convenient jurisdictions whose function is pri­
marily to provide a generic set of services to a mobile population. 
The subsequent evolution of American local government law 
only continued the trend.141 In the early twentieth century, the 
American legal theorist John Dillon advocated a synthetic concep­
tion of local government.142 For Dillon, local governments were the 
convenient agents of state power, they had no status independent of 
the states of which they were a part. A state could "erect, change, 
divide, and even abolish [municipal corporations], at pleasure, as it 
deems the public good to require."143 Against Dillon, others ar­
gued for a right to local self government based on the pre-legisla-
138. See id. at 141-42. 
139. See id. at 142. 
140. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (invalidating state law 
requiring one year's residence in a county for eligibility for nonemergency indigent medical 
care); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (invalidating state law requiring three months 
residence for exercise of the franchise in county election); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 
(1969) (invalidating state law that limited welfare benefits to those residing in jurisdiction for 
at least one year). 
141. I owe this description of the evolution of Dillon's Rule to Gerald Frog. See Frog, 
supra note 125, at 1109-15. 
142. John Dillon was the author of the first treatise on local government law and of the 
now canonical "Dillon's Rule" which calls for strict construction of local government charter 
powers. See JOHN DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1872). 
143. Id. § 30, at 72. 
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tive status of ·· local governments as organic communities and 
voluntary associations. They asserted that "local self-government 
does not owe its origin to constitutions and laws . . . .  [I]t is a part of 
the liberty of community, an expression of community freedom, the 
heart of our political institutions. "144 
Dillon won. In 1907 the Supreme Court in Hunter v. City of 
Pittsburgh145 held that the federal Constitution provided no protec­
tion for local autonomy and no right to local self-government: 
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created 
as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental pow­
ers . . .  as may be entrusted to them . . . .  The state, therefore, at its 
pleasure, may modify or withdraw all [local] powers, may take with­
out compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agen­
cies, expand or contract the territorial area . . .  repeal the charter and 
destroy the corporation. All this may be done . . .  with or without the 
consent of the citizens, or even against their protest.146 
Although the debate continued for several years, by 1912 the syn­
thetic nature of local government advocated by Dillon was, "so well 
recognized that it [was] not . . .  open to question."147 
2. The Return of the Repressed: Organic Jurisdiction in 
American Government 
As we have seen, the history of American jurisdictions was, in 
many ways, the history of the centralization of power and the assim­
ilation of difference. But the organic conception of local jurisdic­
tions did not die. Instead it receded, only to emerge again in a 
mutated and resistant form. As early as the late nineteenth cen­
tury, the advocates of local autonomy advanced amendments to 
state constitutions designed to protect localities from intrusive state 
legislatures.148 The "home rule" movement attempted to provide 
localities with a state law guarantee of the right to self government 
that was rejected as a matter of federal constitutional law in 
Hunter.149 Moreover, while the formal federal constitutional status 
of local governments remains that articulated in Hunter, localities 
have secured significant federal constitutional protection against 
federal and state level intrusion through seemingly inconsequential 
144. 1 EUGENE McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 268, at 680-81 
(2d ed. 1928). 
145. 207 U.S. 161 (1907). 
146. Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178-79. 
147. WILLIAM B. MUNRO, THE GOVERNMENT OF AMERICAN CITIES 53 (1912). 
148. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF TIIE 
UNITED STATES 150 (1985); Frug, supra note 125, at 1116-17. 
149. See Frug, supra note 125, at 1116-17. 
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but actually dispositive dicta150 and through tangentially related 
constitutional doctrines such as the private right to association.151 
As Part III will demonstrate, the organic jurisdiction has been of 
pivotal importance in American political and social life. 
ill. JURISDICTION AS COVERT STATUS: IDEOLOGY 
AND HIERARCHY 
I suggest that we think of liberalism as a certain way of drawing the 
map of the social and political world. The old, preliberal map showed 
a largely undifferentiated land mass, with . . .  no borders . . . .  Society 
was conceived as an organic and integrated whole . . . .  Confronting 
this world, liberal theorists . . .  drew lines, marked off different realms, 
and created the sociopolitical map with which we are still familiar . . . .  
Liberalism is a world of walls, and each one creates a new liberty.152 
The general juridical form that guaranteed a system of rights that 
were egalitarian in principle was supported . . .  by all those systems of 
micro-power that are essentially non-egalitarian and asymmetrical 
that we call the disciplines . . . .  The 'Enlightenment,' which discovered 
the liberties, also invented the disciplines.153 
Territorial jurisdiction is a foundational technology of political 
liberalism. It defines one of two essential units or "selves" of liber­
alism. The liberal concept of "self-government" collapses the for­
mal power of a group (perhaps a "community") to control 
government with the marginal power of an individual to influence 
government: the two sovereign selves are the atomistic self of the 
individual and the communal self of civil society. Liberalism di­
vides the royal body of medieval political theology in two: in the 
myth of Arthur, "the land and the King are one." In modem liberal 
150. The most obvious example of such "stealth doctrine" is the consistent valorization of 
local control of public schools. Although local governments continue to be arms of the states 
as a matter of explicit constitutional law, they !ire implicitly semi-autonomous jurisdictions 
whose interest in self government can override the protection of constitutional rights of equal 
protection. See, e.g., Richard T. Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal 
Analysis, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1841, 1875-76 (1994) [hereinafter Ford, The Boundaries of Race] 
(discussing the tacit support for local autonomy in school desegregation case and school fi­
nancing); Richard T. Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Fonnation and Race 
Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1365, 1382-83 (1997) [hereinafter Ford, Geography and Sover­
eignty] (discussing same in a different context); Joan Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerabil­
ity of American Local Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 Wis. L. 
REv. 83, 110 (describing the emergence of a "quasi-constitutional principle of local 
sovereignty"). 
151. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
152. Michael Walzer, Liberalism and the Art of Separation, 12/3 PoL. THEORY 315, 315 
(1984). 
153. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 222 
(1979). 
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ideology the body of the individual citizen is distinct from, but mir­
rored by, the body politic. 
Just as liberal institutions such as individual rights help to define 
the boundaries of the liberal citizen, so the institutions of jurisdic­
tion define the body politic. These walls of liberalism do in fact 
define liberty, but they do much more than this - they create the 
very entity that is to enjoy liberty. Both individual rights and the 
formal rules of jurisdiction are "technologies of the self"; they are 
discourses and concrete acts that define political selfhood and pro­
vide the model for biological individuals to "perform themselves" 
as (autonomous, rational, profit-maximizing, god fearing, desiring, 
willful, raced, sexed) selves. 
This very process of self construction also facilitates, perhaps 
even requires, the covert, insidious side of the Enlightenment pro­
ject: the institution of discipline. Like liberty, discipline also de­
fines the self, but discipline defines informally. By conditioning 
behavior, it produces self identity through habituation. For exam­
ple, recall the Tango analogy introduced earlier in this Article. The 
individual has a formal liberty to dance in any position or not to 
dance at all. This liberty partially defines the individual as free and 
self-made. But the individual is also disciplined and conditioned to 
accept the position to which her gender corresponds. The Tango 
imposes no formal injunction, but the process of self definition -
the definition of the self, but not entirely by herself - occurs 
nevertheless. 
Through both liberty and discipline a "wall" is built to define 
the individual and shape her behavior. Liberty and discipline both 
contain elements of "choice" and of "coercion." The walls that de­
fine the subject create liberties and also facilitate social disciplines. 
In this way, the jurisdictional art of separation simultaneously cre­
ates "the liberties [and] . . .  the disciplines." 
A. Jurisdiction as the Production of Political Subjectivity 
Territorial sovereignty defines peoples' political identities as citizens 
and forms the basis on which states claim authority over people and 
resources within those boundaries . . . .  [And] modern states have in­
creasingly turned to territorial strategies to control what people can 
do inside national boundaries.154 
The foregoing pages amply support the proposition that jurisdic­
tion is a tool of government. Jurisdiction was developed for the 
154. Vandergeest & Peluso, supra note 40, at 385. 
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purposes of nation-building, for the coordination of governmental 
projects in geographically disparate areas, for the collection and or­
ganization of data, and for the legitimation of public policy. Yet 
governments need more than jurisdictions. They also need citizens: 
people who understand themselves as connected to governmental 
institutions in specific ways. Territorial jurisdiction functions to 
produce such citizen-subjects by encouraging people to behave and 
to think of themselves in particular ways and discouraging other 
modes of behavior and self-knowledge. 
Territorial jurisdictions construct political subjectivity. The or­
ganic description constructs political subjects who understand 
themselves as - and in this sense in fact are - intimately con­
nected in groups that are defended by territorial autonomy. This 
discourse encourages individuals and groups to present themselves 
as organically connected to other people and to territory in a way 
that requires jurisdictional autonomy. It requires that citizens as­
sert, emphasize and even exaggerate their organic connections if 
they are to present a compelling claim for the creation and protec­
tion of their jurisdiction. The synthetic description, by contrast, en­
courages citizens to understand themselves as rational, highly 
mobile, modem individuals whose connections to land are instru­
mental and fungible. Legal discourse to some extent creates these 
dialogically opposed modes of human selfhood, such that an attack 
on a given jurisdictional arrangement can become an attack on the 
very subjectivity of the individuals who are invested in that 
arrangement.155 
The relationships so created are relationships of political status. 
Political theorists traditionally view status relationships as antitheti­
cal to liberal society; the displacement of status relationships by 
contractual relationships is a defining feature of political liberalism 
in particular and modernity in general.156 But territorial identities 
serve as new types of status. They come with a set of rights and 
responsibilities that cannot be well understood as either voluntary 
or natural. To take an extreme but illustrative example, we do not 
believe that blacks living in the Jim Crow south volunteered for 
155. This personhood type claim is evident, for instance, in Board of Education of Kiryas 
Joel Village School District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994), in which the assertion that Satmar 
children were persecuted in majority Gentile schools was considered strong evidence in favor 
of the claim for a separate jurisdiction. It is no less powerfully evident in cases such as San 
Antonio School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), in which the normative principle of 
"local control" was invoked to defeat an equal protection attack on the unequal distribution 
of public resources. 
156. The classic assertion of this idea comes from Sir Henry Maine. See generally MAINE, 
supra note 6. 
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their subordinate condition "by choosing to live within the area of 
its authoritative application."157 Nor, to take a contemporary ex­
ample, is it plausible to describe the jurisdictionally wrapped bundle 
of inferior public services and high taxes that confront the ghetto 
poor as chosen. Even middle-class suburbanites only nominally 
choose the consequences of their residency in a jurisdiction. In 
tight housing markets people take what they can find and afford, 
while in weak housing markets people scramble for property that 
will hold its value. These economic constraints are overwhelming 
for most people. 
Nor are the attributes of jurisdictional residence "natural." No 
particular set of rights and responsibilities naturally comes with res­
idence in a given territory, and the boundaries of the territory itself 
are not natural.158 
The closest analogy to this type of "covert status" relationship is 
the contemporary nuclear family. Family relationships are gener­
ally presented as either voluntary contracts (marriage and adop­
tion) or as natural and prepolitical (the "biological" bond between 
parent and child). Yet neither of these descriptions is satisfactory. 
Marriage has historically been a relationship of status. It continues 
157. Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 82 {1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
158. Three possible objections to my characterization of jurisdiction as status are worthy 
of note. First, perhaps not only jurisdictional relationships, but all social relationships in soci­
eties with entrenched social hierarchies are characterized by unwanted bundling. For in­
stance, not only the home in a segregated jurisdiction, but also the lunch at a segregated 
counter must be understood as unwanted bundling. If I want the house, or the lunch, I have 
to take the segregation and the stigma. The critical point, however, is that jurisdictional 
statuses supplement or even replace many of the more overt types of status. In contempo­
rary American social policy, one notion that justifies a good deal of illegitimate social hierar­
chy is that people choose their circumstances by moving to a particular jurisdiction. Through 
jurisdictional fragmentation, formally neutral laws can easily produce entrenched social hier­
archy. See, e.g., Ford, The Boundaries of Race, supra note 150, at 1849-52. 
Second, one may argue that bundling is not unique to jurisdictional relationships but is 
characteristic of many contractual relationships. For instance, markets are regularly charac­
terized by captive submarkets. If I want the ball game or the movie I have to accept being 
captive to the lousy concession stand, etc. I would argue that the extent of bundling that 
occurs in jurisdictions is far greater than that in most other markets. 
Fmally, one could argue that the factor that accounts for increased bundling is, again, not 
jurisdiction, but land in general. Here one might argue that the natural spatial constraints of 
distance and proximity make bundling inevitable. If I want the house I have to take the 
easement or the covenant because the only way my neighbor can get the bundle he wants is 
for me to be stuck with the corresponding obligations. This objection does not undermine 
my larger point. Jurisdiction evolved from property relationships and so it is not surprising 
that the two bear a family resemblance. See discussion of Maine, supra section II.B. I do not 
wish to argue for a sharp distinction between jurisdiction and other territorial relationships 
that implicate governmental power (as property relationships undeniably do, see, e.g., Morris 
R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CoRNELL L.Q. 8, 11-14 {1927) (recognizing private 
property rights as a form of sovereignty)). In fact, this Article has explicitly argued that 
jurisdiction is a social practice that involves both public and private institutions. See supra 
section II.C. 
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to be so at least to the extent that many terms of the standard ar­
rangement are nonwaivable or intentionally made very difficult to 
waive. The traditional marriage imposed gendered positions within 
a hierarchy that could not be bargained around. And today, the 
marriage relationship is not a contract that any two otherwise com­
petent parties can adopt. The status of spouse is unavailable to 
those who choose a partner of the same sex; those who wish to at­
tain the status of spouse are required to choose a partner of a differ­
ent sex. 
Nor can the most important legal consequences of parenthood 
be explained by the bare fact of biological connection. There is 
nothing natural about the presumption that biological parents have 
custody over their offspring even against the will of the offspring 
themselves. Indeed the very notion of custody seems derived from 
a property relationship that is thoroughly . legally constructed. 
There is nothing natural about the right of parents to control the 
religious and ideological upbringing of their children even against 
the wishes of neighbors, local communities and society at large -
indeed such a right was probably unthinkable in the close .knit com­
munities that characterized most of human civilization until quite 
recently. 
Likewise, the status of resident comes with a host of nonwaiv­
able terms. Like marriage, it can be withheld depending on one's 
choice of personal associations.159 And like the parent/child rela­
tionship, few of the legal implications of residence follow naturally 
from "the facts" - in this case physical presence or domicile in the 
jurisdiction.160 
1. From the Great Strategies of Geo-Politics to the Little Tactics 
of the Habitat 
Of course jurisdiction, unlike the family, is a public institution. 
But many jurisdictions produce seemingly private social identities. 
Because American society was historically dominated by private so­
cial institutions, the development of American jurisdictions took on 
159. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2, 9 (1974) (upholding local ordi­
nance that prohibits cohabitation by more than two person not related by blood, adoption or 
marriage). 
160. For example, because one lives in a jurisdiction, it does not follow that one should 
have to support the education of children in that jurisdiction, and only children in that juris­
diction. If the rationale is that residents will benefit from an educated population, such a 
benefit does not logically begin or end at the boundaries of the jurisdiction. If the rationale is 
a more general moral obligation as a member of a political community, then it is unclear why 
the obligation should end at the "necessarily arbitrary" borders of the local jurisdiction, 
rather than extending to the nation as a whole, or even beyond. 
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what we would today consider a distinctly private cast. This privat­
ism - the promotion of individual mobility and contractual/market 
relationships - complemented the creation of territorial statuses. 
Private social groups used jurisdiction in order to maintain status 
hierarchies based on race and national origin, and because the 
groups were not a part of a formal state apparatus, the practices 
were defended as free association and the exercise of the right of 
contract.161 But governmental bureaucracies were actively involved 
in the creation of new jurisdictionally defined statuses. Govern­
ment encouraged and facilitated the nominally private actions and 
expertly catalogued the social demographics that resulted. For ex­
ample, federally subsidized home mortgages encouraged and even 
required homeowners to enter into racially restrictive real cove­
nants. Federal officials catalogued neighborhoods according to 
their racial composition as part of an explicit policy to prohibit the 
use of mortgage subsidies in black or integrated neighborhoods.162 
Both the formal state and private social groups acted in concert 
as "government" in this respect. Not only did private actors draw 
on the power of the state to enforce status hierarchies through con­
tract and property, but-more importantly perhaps-private actors 
and state institutions acted in tacit collusion to perpetuate a racial/ 
territorial status hierarchy. Private actors supplied the content that 
would have been constitutionally impermissible if developed by the 
state, while the state supplied the coercive force of law, unavailable 
to private individuals. Therefore, rather than discuss the state de­
fined in opposition to civil society, I will proceed with an analysis of 
government, understood to include both public and private actors 
that have a formal legal status or systematically exercise state de­
rived power. 
We could think of a continuum between larger and smaller terri­
torial institutions, with the family at one pole and the nation-state 
161. Racially restrictive zoning practices were constitutional until the landmark decision 
in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). After that, private restrictive covenants were 
quietly encouraged by the federal, state and local government as an effective substitute and 
remained so at least until 1948, when they too were struck down in Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 
U.S. 1 (1948). Incorporation of new municipalities also served to promote status segregation 
and hierarchy. See JACKSON, supra note 148, at 150·51 (asserting that the desire to avoid 
recent immigrants in the inner cities was one of the most important motivations for suburban 
incorporation); Richard F. Muth, The Causes of Housing Segregation, in IssuES IN Hous1No 
D1scRIM1NATION 3, 8 (1986) (noting the importance of restrictive zoning in "maintain[ing] 
segregation of suburban areas"). 
162. See CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OF PREJUDICE IN Hous. 
ING 229-37 (1955). 
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at the other. Understood as government,163 these institutions are 
homologous and continuous rather than sharply divided: 
[W]hereas the doctrine of the prince and the juridical theory of sover­
eignty are constantly attempting to draw the line between the power 
of the prince and any other form of power . . .  [it is] the art of govern­
ment . . .  to establish a continuity . . . .  [A] person who wishes to 
govern the state well must first learn how to govern himself, his goods 
and his patrimony . . . .  [and] when a state is well run, the head of the 
family will know how to look after his family, his goods and his patri­
mony . . . . [T]he central term of this continuity is the government of 
the family, termed economy.164 
Hence the jurisdictional plan of straight-sided territories estab­
lished for the Western states mirrored the grid created for govern­
mental homestead land grants and the gridiron plan of the 
American metropolis. Similarly, the identity of blood and race es­
tablished in the family, the private identity of local membership and 
the public identity of national citizenship ar� continuous. Each is 
accomplished through a blend of voluntary and involuntary rela­
tions, each is anchored in a territory - home, locality, nation -
163. There is a risk that this use of the term "government" can slip into tautology. If 
government is understood too broadly, to become synonymous- with "culture" or "society," 
then the assertion that "government mirrors society" becomes: "society mirrors itself." On 
the other hand, government in Foucault's sense denotes more than the formal institutions of 
the state. Foucault means to describe a broader set of institutions - of which those of the 
formal state may not even be· the most important - that all operate in similar ways to pro­
duce a similar form of social control, discipline and organization. Foucault's most consistent 
examples are the school, the prison, the criminal justice system, the medical clinic, the mili­
tary and the family. Each of these institutions encourages a particular type of regimentation, 
of which we consider the military and the prison to be paradigmatic. To take only one exam­
ple, behavioral control is established through routine, repetition and surveillance. Social rit­
ual is taught nightly at the family dinner table ("use the correct fork"); school teaches 
children through drills and repetitive exercises; both the prison and the military regiment 
daily activity to "reform" or "remake" the rank and file; even medical therapy generally 
involves establishing physical or mental routines. Each of these social practices is designed to 
produce and instill normal and habitual behavior - the prescribed activity becomes "second 
nature." See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 153; MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF THE 
CLINIC (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., 1973) (1963). 
At this point, a brief discussion of "structuralism" is relevant. "Governmentality" could 
be interpreted as "deep structure" that lies beneath the institutions it describes. One might 
read Foucault to mean that the "logic" of governmentality secretly informs all institutions of 
the society, in each case producing the same inevitable result. This interpretation, while plau­
sible, is unnecessary. Various institutions that operate in a given society or milieu may bor­
row techniques and practices from each other and may build on the techniques and practices 
of each other. For instance, the aircraft industry of World War II borrowed assembly line 
techniques from Ford Motors and thereby also produced workers who were good at assembly 
line work and who understood the division of labor. This in turn made other businesses more 
likely to model their practice on the division of labor. We may call this mode of production 
"Fordism." Nothing in this narrative suggests a "deep structure," but it does suggest more 
than coincidence or uncoordinated individual choices and something other than what we 
normally understand as coercion. 
164. Michel Foucault, Govemmentality, in THE FoucAULT EFFECT 87, 91-92 (Graham 
Burchell et al. eds., 1991). 
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and each is inexorably linked to a type of government - head of 
household, territorial local government, national sovereignty. 
2. Residence and Domicile: The Metaphysics of 
Territorial Presence 
All well and good, one may respond, but an institution like the 
family is primarily concerned with personal membership or status 
- territory is of secondary importance. In the case of public insti­
tutions this priority is reversed. Governments are defined by terri­
tory - personal membership is a side-effect of territorial dominion. 
Governments simply govern whoever happens into their territory. 
On this view, jurisdiction is a simple relationship between gov­
ernment and physical territory: the goal of jurisdiction would be to 
establish dominion over a particular physical space. But this expla­
nation, while partially accurate, is incomplete. Jurisdiction in fact 
defines a relationship between the government and individuals, me­
diated by space. Territory acts as a medium of governmental power 
as well as its primary object. Territory is, in this sense, a container 
that holds a bundle of individuals and resources, just as fee simple 
ownership of real property consists of a bundle of rights. 
Moreover, the relationship between a territory and the individu­
als and resources it "holds" is not a natural or necessary correspon­
dence. It is not a relationship of empirical fact but one of positive 
design. The first year student of property law learns that a subter­
ranean gas reservoir "belongs" to a given piece of property only 
due to a set of contingent legal rules. The resources can be severed 
from ownership of the land on the surface and its status as property 
may depend on factors other than the status of the land immedi­
ately above it. 
The contingency of the relationship between individuals and ter­
ritory is much more pronounced. Individuals move more easily 
than most subterranean resources. An individual may occupy sev­
eral cities within the course of a day and own property in several 
states or nations or "do business" in a number of jurisdictions. The 
assertion that an individual "belongs" to a particular jurisdiction for 
a particular purpose relies on a host of potentially controversial 
premises and arrives through scores of leaps of faith and logic. 
In short, when we say that a particular resource or person is 
"present" in a jurisdiction, we mean both more and less than physi­
cal presence. It may be that the legally present individual is physi­
cally absent (as in the case of the fugitive from justice or the 
absentee voter), or that the physically present individual is legally 
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absent (as in the case of the homeless person without formal domi­
cile or the undocumented alien). Jurisdictional presence is not 
physical but metaphysical. It is a relationship that refers to the 
physical and is analogous to the physical, but is something other 
than physical. 
Legal presence does not simply follow from physical presence. 
For instance, in the United States, for the purposes of taxation, vot­
ing and access to most public services, the metaphysical presence at 
issue is formally defined as domicile or residence. One is meta­
physically present in the jurisdiction of her domicile, even when she 
is actually walking the streets of a foreign city. Her presence in the 
place of residence is real for legal purposes. The physical location 
of her body is irrelevant. The notion of residence operates by anal­
ogy to physical presence. We assume that people are usually at 
home, that they care most about home, that they identify with 
home, and therefore we "find" them at home for legal purposes, 
even if they are physically somewhere else. It is as if a New Yorker 
were always in New York - where she resides - even when she is 
physically in Los Angeles. 
The principle that the franchise and many other local rights and 
privileges may be limited to residents of a jurisdiction establishes a 
jurisdictional status or identity. The theory of residence is premised 
on a correspondence between residence and membership in a polit­
ical community. But as a matter of political theory there is no rea­
son that these two must correspond. The meaning of residence is 
overdetermined. Residential presence may indicate a decision to 
join a political community but it may also reflect a fungible invest­
ment in property; it may reflect agreement with the values and pri­
orities currently dominant in the jurisdiction or a desire to 
intervene in changing those values and priorities. 
Residence does not reflect natural connections between individ­
uals, groups and territory. Nor does it simply formalize the volun­
tary choices of autonomous individuals. Instead, residence is a 
concept that stabilizes, by fiat, a necessarily uneasy relationship be­
tween mapped territories and an increasingly mobile and unknow­
able population. And it does more than this. By tying the 
individual to a stable referent - a fixed place - it creates for her a 
political identity that is only nominally chosen. The status of resi­
dence requires the citizen to accept a limited number of jurisdic­
tionally "bundled" rights and responsibilities. Moreover, it requires 
the citizen to identify territorially, to define herself according to her 
relationship to territory. 
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B. The Jurisdiction of "Local Knowledge" 
This section will explore the relationship between jurisdiction, 
political subjectivity and the assertion of local particularity. Specifi­
cally, it will respond in more detail to the belief that centralized 
power is exercised primarily by repressing local differences in favor 
of homogeneity and uniformity. It will argue that territorial power 
is exercised not only through repression or exclusion of difference 
and centralization, not only through homogenization or assimilation 
to a mean, but also through the production of difference. 
The argument of this section parallels that of Michel Foucault in 
the classic The History of Sexuality: An lntroduction. 165 Foucault 
argued against the common understanding that the institutions of 
bourgeois society from the Victorian era to the present have oper­
ated to repress the natural and authentic sexuality of individuals 
(the "repressive hypothesis"). Instead, Foucault argued, the 
Victorians were obsessed with sexuality, they saw it everywhere, 
they constantly discussed it, insisted on its relevance and deployed 
it as a description of many forms of human behavior. They pro­
duced sexuality by defining human behavior in terms of sexuality, 
defining individuals as sexed in various ways, and cataloguing and 
constructing sexual typologies. Far from repression, this production 
of sexuality was, according to Foucault, what defined the Victorian 
attitude toward sex, and this production of sexuality was a means of 
control. It was a technology that defined the self according to its 
sexuality, and thereby kept individuals under a type of sexual sur­
veillance. Further, if anything repressed authentic eroticism - a 
term whose ontological status is, for Foucault, questionable at best 
- it was the incessant production of sexuality that limited the pos­
sibilities of erotic expression by imposing upon individual eroticism 
a narrow universe of sexual types. 
Now let us turn to jurisdiction. Contemporary discussions of 
ethnic and cultural diversity characteristically involve a struggle be­
tween "universalism" or "common values" on the one hand and 
"cultural diversity" or "respect for difference" on the other. In the 
national context, those who favor "universalism" - actually na­
tionalism - lament the fracturing of the nation into antagonistic 
factions, ethnic enclaves and oppositional subcultures.166 They ad­
vocate a "return" to a common identity, a common purpose and a 
165. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME 1: AN INTRODUCTION 
(Robert Hurley trans., 1978) (1976). 
166. See generally ETZIONI, supra note 116; JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE CULTURE 
OF CONTENTMENT (1992); TODD GITLIN, THE TWILIGHT OF COMMON DREAMS: WHY 
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common culture. By contrast, those who fear cultural homogeneity 
insist that cultural differences reflect the true and authentic expres­
sions of organic social groups and that failure to respect these dif­
ferences is a form of tyranny.167 They advocate a strategy of 
resistance to cultural hegemony through the assertion of difference. 
When the question of political territoriality is introduced into 
this debate, the consequences are predictable. Those in favor of 
solidarity seek to prevent the formation of culturally defined juris­
dictional subdivisions, wrongly imagining that such divisions would 
be new and unprecedented and fearing that such divisions would 
hasten the fracturing of the nation.168 Those who favor difference 
embrace jurisdictional "autonomy" as a means of protecting minor­
ity cultures from hegemonic oppression and compulsory 
assimilation.169 
In this conversation, the "repressive hypothesis" is that Power is 
exercised exclusively by those who would censor and repress cul­
tural difference and impose a unitary and repressive common cul­
ture. But the analytic mistake that underlies this repressive 
hypothesis is shared by both sides of the debate. B oth sides assume 
that there is an inevitable opposition between common identity and 
the assertion of difference. The universalists argue that the myopic 
assertion of difference stands between "us" and meaningful solidar­
ity. Meanwhile, the champions of difference insist that the repres­
sive project of solidarity must yield to respect for authentic cultural 
difference.110 
AMERICA Is WRACKED BY CULTURE WARS (1995); MICHAEL LIND, THE NEXT AMERICAN 
NATION: THE NEW NATIONALISM AND THE FOURTH AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1995). 
167. In the more shrill version of this position one hears terms such as "cultural geno­
cide" and "fascism" employed with disturbing obliviousness to their historical referents. 
168. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (describing a North Carolina redistrict­
ing plan as analogous to racial segregation); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 910-12 (1995) 
(striking down Georgia redistricting as racial gerrymandering). 
169. See generally, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 
(1989) (arguing that liberalism requires the accommodation of certain culturally distinctive 
groups through the creation of separate territories). 
170. This local repression hypothesis takes on many forms. For example the "new feder­
alism" involving the resurgence of support for "state's rights" implicates siniilar concerns. 
The supporters of expanded state autonomy argue for respect for state (and at times local) 
cultures, while the opponents stress the need for common values and national coordination. 
It is rarely noted that many of the strongest supporters of state's rights are members of the 
federal legislature. Few of these supporters embrace state autonomy consistently. Instead, 
they hope to reverse or block particular policies that are popular at the federal level - gun 
control, abortion rights, civil rights, environmental protection - by shifting the relevant fo­
rum to the state level. The supporters of national uniformity are no more consistent in this 
regard. The same people who insist on national uniformity in the context of civil rights for 
racial minorities will champion state's rights when it comes to gay marriages. Much of the 
new federalism amounts to rhetorically sophisticated forum shopping. The debate over 
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This section- will critique the uncritical embrace of difference 
that characterizes a good deal of contemporary left or postmodern 
multiculturalism. I focus on this side of the debate for two reasons. 
One, I am personally allied with left multiculturalism and sympa­
thetic to many of its goals. I hope to advance those goals in some 
small way by helping to defeat a bad strategy based on misconcep­
tions, dogma and cant. Two, I hope that I have something new to 
say about the fetishism of difference, while most of what I would 
say against the "universalistic" - usually covertly nationalist -
project (and I would say a good deal against it) has already been 
quite well put by others, to whom I am greatly indebted. 
The production of difference was and is often a critical part of 
nationalist hegemony. Not only does nationalism require the well­
chronicled production of differences among nation-states, but it 
also requires the production of difference within the national com­
munity. As we have seen, internal local distinctiveness often pro­
vides the cultural content that distinguishes one nation-state from 
another; in many cases, the national culture is more or less the sum 
of its local parts. Further, a nativist identity can be forged in oppo­
sition to internal foes as easily as against external enemies. Na­
tional institutions are built and strengthened on the basis of 
reaction to internal sedition or cultural degeneration. History is full 
of nationalist wars against domestic enemies, both real and 
imagined. As proof, one need only name the Star Chamber, the 
Gulag, the House Committee on Un-American Activities. And as 
D.W. Griffith's notorious film reveals, racial division played the 
midwife's role in the Birth of a Nation.111 
These examples demonstrate that national hegemony is not in­
consistent with the assertion of sub-national difference. They 
should shame those who, while advocating new projects of national 
solidarity, blame the familiar racial or culturally defined victim for 
national decline. They should also warn racial and culturally de­
fined groups that the language of difference and autonomy may be 
a trap. 
The institution of jurisdiction does its most important work, not 
by repressing local difference, but by producing it, by dividing soci­
ety into distinctive local units that are imposed on individuals and 
groups. The discourse of the organic jurisdiction encourages minor­
ity groups to seek out territorial autonomy as a means to resist the 
state's rights rhetorically pits national uniformity against state autonomy, but, practically 
speaking, it concerns a number of ideological conflicts that cut across jurisdictional divisions. 
171. THE BIRTH OF A NATION (David W. Griffith Corp. & Epoch Producing Corp. 1915). 
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power of an often hostile government and the hegemony of the ma­
jority culture. But separate territorial status rarely delivers on its 
promise of autonomy. Often, the subordinate group unwittingly 
conspires in its own continued subordination and participates in its 
own quarantine. A subordinate group may insist that it only wishes 
to attain the type of "autonomy" that members of the majority en­
joy. But the position of security that the dominant group enjoys 
requires the subjugation of a subordinate group. No group can en­
tirely control its own fate without also controlling other groups 
around it. The coveted position in question is not autonomy, but 
hegemony - a position that, by definition, everyone cannot occupy. 
Autonomy is a false promise because it promises access to a space 
outside of power, a safe haven from the threat of subjugation, con­
trol or influence by outsiders. Such a space does not exist. 
1. The Centralization Hypothesis 
It is often said that the history of modernity, the ideological -his­
tory of something called "liberalism," is the history of centraliza­
tion.172 According to this account, the modernist project was the 
project of rationalization, universalism, uniformity, order. Neigh­
borhood businesses and artisans' guilds gave way to national and 
international conglomerates. Cottage industry gave way to econo­
mies of scale and the Fordist division of labor.173 The clan yielded 
place to the province, which in tum was supplanted by the nation­
state.174 Landscapes and communities that were once varied and 
opaque became regimente� and transparent to the eye of power: 
the Norman Conquest unified the tribes of Eri.gland,175 Baron 
Haussmann forced the labyrinth of medieval Paris to yield to the 
Grand Avenues of the modem city of light.176 
This account holds that the modem state struck out against local 
culture and particularity in every possible respect. It imposed na­
tional languages governed by uniform grammatical rules to smother 
local dialects and idioms.177 It routinized the collection of taxes to 
crush local fiefdoms and supplant provincial clientelism. It elimi­
nated local territories in order to facilitate the smooth application 
of justice and the free alienation of land. It prohibited the varie-
172. See supra note 116. 
173. See DAVID HARVEY, THE CoNDmoN OF PosTMODERNITY 125-40 {1989). 
174. See generally Anderson, supra note 79. 
175. See supra section II.B.2. 
176. See, e.g., HARVEY, supra note 173, at 16-17. 
177. See supra section II.B.l. 
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gated customs of dispute resolution in favor of uniform justice and 
universal rights. Each of these projects required centralization: a 
single sovereign, a uniform standard of measure, a common tongue, 
a common law. So the history of the modern era is the history of 
the centralization of authority, of economy and of culture. It is the 
story of the birth of the universal everyman and the suppression of 
the particular personality. It is the narrative of uniformity, homo­
geneity, the celebration of the one and the censorship of difference. 
This, anyway, has become the standard account of things in dis­
ciplines as varied as human geography, ethnic studies and the his­
tory of law. It is an easy story to tell, if only because it coincides so 
well with such a variety of ideological precommitments. For the 
right, the death of localism is a product of the tyranny of intermed­
dling government, a Frankenstein's creation of liberal social engi­
neering that defined the New Deal, the Warren Court and the 
Great Society. For the old left, the destruction of local particularity 
is nothing other than a symptom of industrial capitalism: the cen­
tralization of political authority serves the centralization of the 
means of production; a uniform and fungible political subjectivity 
follows the reduction of human labor to fungible capital and the 
reduction of human needs to fungible commodities. Meanwhile, 
the social movements of the new left lament an inexorable centrali­
zation of power as the active repression of (counter) cultural differ­
ence and subversive identities; Washington, D.C. represents the 
repressive injunction to adopt the voice of "middle America" and 
the establishment, to accept the disciplinary image of the "reason­
able man," the men in gray suits, or simply, "the man." 
Historically, modern cartography played a critical role in this 
relentless governmental centralization: "Cartography became in­
separable from the affirmation of monarchic power . . . . The king 
could now sit in his chamber and 'without troubling himself greatly, 
see with his eye and touch with his finger' the expanse and diversity 
of his territory - without having to travel at all."17s 
Diversity? But wasn't this diversity precisely what was wiped 
out, crushed, assimilated? This passage suggests that centralization 
tells only part of the story. Always buried within these narratives of 
inexorable, unmediated, unmodified centralization, one finds a 
glimpse of its opposite: an explosion of differentiation, the produc­
tion of ever new categories that are represented as "merely descrip-
178. Jacques Revel, Knowledge of the Territory, 4 Sci. IN CONTEXT 133, 150-51 (1991) 
(quoting R. HERvE, L'OEVRE CARTOGRAPHIQUE DE NICOLAS DE NICOLAY ET D'ANroINB 
DE LAROL (1544-1619) {1956)) (emphasis added). 
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tive" mappings. No doubt, there was a trend toward centralization 
that characterized a significant program of modem government; 
universalism was imposed, difference was punished and censored. 
But there was also, and to a significant extent, the opposite phe­
nomena: typology, sorting, differentiation to an ever more "pre­
cise" and infinitesimal degree, a carving up into distinct parts. This 
too is the legacy of modernity and of liberal democracy. 
This paradoxical differentiation cannot be fully understood as 
"resistance." The point is not that the members of organic social 
groups managed, by their tenacity, to cling to local customs despite 
the imposition of the common law and central courts,179 it is not 
that villages and provinces stubbornly continued to speak dialect in 
the face of sanctions for failure to speak the language of the 
state,180 it is not that villages and townships retained their unique 
character in the face of urban consolidation. Alongside these well 
acknowledged acts of resistance, but hidden in the shadows, was the 
active production of localism, the creation of territorially structured 
differentiation through the institutions of modem government: the 
state, the corporation, the university and the jurisdiction.181 
Thus it may be said that localism itself, localism in all of its par­
ticularity and difference, was the child, rather than the enemy, of 
the modem state.182 Alongside the well chronicled attempt to 
stamp out local particularity, we also have the production, creation, 
definition and interrogation of the local in its territorially located 
specificity. "The local" as a concept, as a category, as a significant 
object of concern, is the product of a governmental discourse whose 
goal was to catalogue, define and manage a territory by dividing it 
into knowable and distinct parts. 
2. Localism as Discursive Effect 
[The Great Khan owns an atlas where all the cities of the empire and 
the neighboring realms are drawn] 
"I think you recognize cities better on the atlas than when you 
visit them in person," the emperor says to Marco, snapping the vol­
ume shut. 
And [Marco] Polo answers, "Traveling, you realize that differences 
are lost: each city takes to resembling all cities, places exchange their 
form, order, distances, a shapeless dust cloud invades the continents. 
179. See supra section II.B.2. 
180. See supra section II.B.1. 
181. It is no accident that all of these institutions at one time answered to the same name: 
corporation. See, e.g., RICHARD SENNETT, FLESH AND STONE 202-03 (1994). 
182. Though to be sure children are known to rebel against their parents. 
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Your atlas preserves the differences intact: that assortment of quali­
ties which are like the letters in a name."183 
It is true that the conditions of everyday life that are offered as 
evidence of "local culture" existed chronologically prior to any in­
quiry by a central government. But conceptually, these conditions 
did not preexist government inquiry - they did not exist as objects 
of study or interest. They were context and background, taken for 
granted or simply ignored. Rather than the defining characteristics 
of a localism that was celebrated or condemned, these conditions 
were simply the conditions of existence for some group of people at 
a given moment in time. They were facts, but facts without mean­
ing in the absence of context. For instance, it is a "fact" that as I 
write these words I am wearing a black suit, but this probably 
"means" very little to you. If, on the other hand, you were to hy­
pothesiZe that a black suit symbolized something, like "black 
power," "post modernist artisto-symp," "reservoir dog," or "federal 
agent," then the suit would have acquired meaning through your act 
of interpretation. You might then write a magazine article about 
"the real men in black" which would provide additional data: 
"Cynical postmodern thirty-something technofetishist with a 
penchant for mid-century modem design and style." My black suit 
would have been transformed from a mere fact into a characteristic, 
a fact imbued with social meaning that identifies or defines a social 
group. 
Although my black suit preexists the magazine article chrono­
logically, the meaning of the suit as a uniform of the "real men in 
black" does not preexist the media disquisition. I may well only 
know my "community" through the media's construction. Sud­
denly I "realize" that I wear a black suit, not because black is flat­
tering and doesn't show coffee stains, but because I am a member 
of a local culture that favors black suits. At that point, other "facts" 
about my life might fall into a profile: a love of mid-century jazz 
becomes part of a penchant for cultural and aesthetic modernism, 
the Apple Powerbook that contains this Article becomes a symp­
tom of technofetishism. Add a territorial classification, "these noir 
clad neo-modernists hail from Northern California," and you have a 
full blown local culture.184 
183. lTALO CALVINO, lNvISIBLE CITIES 137 (1972). 
184. Note that the local culture can absorb a wide range of new and even inconsistent 
facts: smoking is a retro-hip affectation (rather than an addiction), not smoking demon­
strates that one is "beyond hip" (rather than simply health conscious); ownership of a mobile 
telephone is evidence of technophilia and links to the fast paced communications grid, non­
ownership of the cell phone is evidence of a hyper cool disdain for technological overload, an 
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This is "the discursive production of localism.'t: "'Discursive pro­
duction" is different from "social production." Social production 
simply means that the object of study is not naturally occurring but 
is instead the product of a particular society. "1bile localism is so­
cially produced, such an observation is uninteresting - no one 
thinks otherwise. "Discursive p_roduction" denotes something 
more: that localism generally - the idea of localism, and any given 
local "culture" or locality - may be an artifact of some observer 
who identifies it, records it and interrogates it for some purpose of 
the observer's. Localism on this account is not itself an attri�ute, 
but is instead a process, a process that turns a set of attributes into 
characteristics of a type, elements in a taxonomy.185 The represen­
tational medium through which governments record and categorize 
locality is the map; the legal mechanism by which governments cre­
ate and manage locality is the political jurisdiction. 
C. Racism's Borders: Jurisdiction as Social Quarantine 
"Good racial government" . . .  requires information about racial na­
ture: about character and culture, history and traditions,, that is, 
about the limits of the Other's possibilities . . . .  [The Other] may be 
employed but only as informant . . . . The spaces of the Other - the 
colonies, plantations, reservations, puppet governments and client 
states, the villages and townships, or the prisons, ganglands, ghettoes, 
and crowded inner cities - become the laboratory in which these epis­
temological constructs may be tested . . . .  Knowledge, accordingly, is 
socially managed . . . . 186 
The organic jurisdiction appears to recognize the uniqueness of 
various social groups, and their connection to a: �erritorial home­
land, a sphere of cultural belonging, a place. This has led many to 
celebrate the construction of organic jurisdictions and to articulate 
claims for social justice in terms of separation and jurisdictional au-
aesthetic decision to simplify one's lifestyle, a super-elite nonchalance ("someone else han­
dles your calls") rather than a limited budget. 
185. Michel Foucault makes a similar point regarding the social sciences in general using 
the "Chinese Encyclopredia" ofBorges's imagination, in which "animals are divided into: (a) 
belonging to the Emperor, {b) embali:ned, (c) tame, {d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, 
{g) stray dogs, {h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, G) innumerable, {k) 
drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (1) et cetera, {m) having just broken the water pitcher, 
(n) that from along way off look like flies." MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS xv 
{1973). The simple point is that such a taxonomy, so different from any that we recognize as 
logical, could, in a vastly different 'social milieu, exist. The categories, although strange, are 
"true" - they "can be assigned a precise meaning and a demonstrable content . . .  What 
transgresses the boundaries of all imagination, of all possible thought, is simply that alphabet­
ical series . . .  which links each of those categories to all the others." Id. at xv-xvi. 
186. DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, RACIST CuLTURE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE PoLmcs OF 
MEANING 150-51 {1993) (emphasis added). 
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tonomy. Even in the highly urban, industrialized and culturally pol­
yglot societies of the Western capitalist democracies, the assertion 
of organic cultural community is appealing. Evoking a fairly direct 
analogy to a historical or mythical homeland or place of origin, the 
desire for a safe space of jurisdictional autonomy resonates with the 
often understandable desire for cultural nationalism and ethnic 
autarchy. 
But the organic jurisdiction can be as much the product of cen­
tralized power as the synthetic: each serves a unique purpose in the 
structure of government. Organic jurisdiction divides society into 
groups that need no further justification. The explanation for the 
character of the group may be nature, culture or voluntarism, but 
the effect is to justify the uneven treatment of individuals by the 
state. 
1. The Jurisdiction of Apartheid 
The most notorious example of the oppressive production of dif­
ference is the apartheid of mid- to late-twentieth century South Af­
rica (what I will call "late apartheid," to separate it from the cruder 
policies of the earlier twentieth-century regime ).187 What separates 
late apartheid from the Jim Crow laws of the American South is the 
intricacy of the former in both the architecture of the physical sepa­
ration and its legitimation. In both its material and its ideological 
aspects, the separatist regime of South Africa was as marked an 
advance over American Jim Crow as the gas chamber is over the 
hangman's noose. These "advances" were primarily the result of 
jurisdictional production. In both its material and ideological ef­
fects, late apartheid marked a conspicuous expansion of jurisdic­
tional strategies. 
The pass laws that enforced a rigorous separation between white 
urban areas and black shanty towns are the globally notorious sym­
bols of apartheid. More insidious was the elaborate system of eth­
nic homelands created by the South African government. These 
homelands or bantustans were both a material and an ideological 
program. The bantustans marked the formalization of South Afri­
can racism and its translation into the language of natural "recogni-
187. It bears noting that the South African government did not itself refer to its new, 
improved version of racial separatism as "apartheid" but rather, in the manner of any good 
marketer, coined new terms for its noxious product: "separate development," "multination­
alism," and the strikingly disingenuous "self-determination." See Anne McC!intock & Rob 
Nixon, No Names Apart: The Separation of Word and History in Derrida's "Le Dernier Mot 
du Racisme," in "RACE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE 339, 341 (Henry Louis Gates Jr. ed., 
1986) (an excellent essay in its own right, but a failure as a response to Derrida). 
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tion" and, therefore, of inevitability. The bantustan policy effected 
the expulsion of black South Africans from developed urban areas 
- except on limited terms of benefit to whites - and from some 
eighty-seven percent of all land in the nation, including all of the 
most fertile and mineral rich property.188 Black "citizenship" was 
imposed in the bantustans, with the logical consequence that blacks 
were stripped of the rights of citizens in the newly constructed 
white South Africa: 
As the Minister of Bantu Development put it in a 1978 speech: "if 
our policy is taken to its full logical conclusion as far as the black 
people are concerned, there will not be one black man with South 
African citizenship." Since 1960, the government has forcibly reset­
tled 3.5 million Africans and effectively deprived 8 million of their 
citizenship by means of statutes carefully worded to avoid defining 
citizenship on racial grounds.189 
Ideologically, late apartheid functioned by naturalizing racial 
difference and segregation. It accomplished this through the con­
struction of a knowledge of the local. The homelands were both 
synthetic and organic jurisdictions: the Nationalist government 
deployed the technology of jurisdiction to create a set of "natural" 
territorial tribal divisions within the nation-state. Late apartheid 
marshaled a regulatory apparatus that was necessarily also a statis­
tical apparatus, a social scientific apparatus and a cartographic ap­
paratus. The apartheid state struggled to study, know, catalogue 
and map the races. This effort culminated in the construction of 
separate jurisdictional spaces that appeared to be their own 
justification. 
The ethnic bantustans, comprised of eighty-one scattered home­
lands, entrenched, expanded and justified apartheid. Now forced 
segregation was rhetorically transformed into respect for difference. 
The domination of the few became a democratic confederacy: 
[T]he bantustan system . . .  serv[ ed] the ideological purpose of justify­
ing Nationalist claims that their policy is no longer one of racial dis­
crimination but of safeguarding the sovereignty of distinct "nations." 
. . .  By pointing to the ten bantustans, the government can claim that 
"numerically the White nation is superior to all other nations in South 
Africa . . . .  It demonstrates the folly of saying that a minority govern­
ment is ruling others in South Africa."190 
In late apartheid South Africa, each tribal nation was recognized, 
even celebrated, for its distinctiveness. 
188. See id. at 348. 
189. Id. at 350 (internal citations omitted). 
190. Id. at 351 (final alteration in original). 
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Apartheid's use of the organic jurisdiction was not designed pri­
marily to separate or even to exclude blacks from white South Af­
rica. Blacks entered white areas on a daily basis in order to 
perform manual labor. The effect of the organic discourse was not 
to exclude, but to define and control. The claim was not that the 
bantustans were separate nation-states, but that they were separate 
nations within one state: the state of South Africa. They were or­
gans of the state. The organic nationalism of late apartheid did not 
even offer the intuitively natural trade off: auton9my but at the 
cost of isolation. Instead it enforced subordination through the 
production of a structurally subordinate identity. Each organ occu­
pied its natural place on a hierarchy, with whites at the top 
(naturally). 
2. American Apartheid? 
South African apartheid was unique in its comprehensiveness, 
its ruthlessness and the sophistication of its jurisdictional strategy. 
Nevertheless, it is not without parallel. In the United States, terms 
such as "urban poor" are almost synonymous with racial minority 
groups, particularly blacks. The "chocolate city/vanilla suburb" 
pattern is dominant in the popular consciousness, if not in the in­
creasingly comple� reality of contemporary metropolitan 
demographics. Not only is the "inner city" identified with African 
Americans, but particular jurisdictions are known to be "black cit­
ies": major urban centers such as Detroit, Washington, D.C., St. 
Louis and Oakland, but also smaller cities such as Chelsea, Massa­
chusetts and East Palo Alto, California. There are also "Asian cit­
ies" such as Monterey Park, California and "Latino cities" such as 
Miami, Florida. 
Of course no one literally is forced into any of these jurisdic­
tions. In fact, in many cases people fought hard to establish them as 
minority enclaves.191 The hope was to create a safe space in which 
the minority group could :flourish and enjoy autonomy. But "local 
autonomy" has not served historically subordinated groups well. 
Because local government autonomy is not constitutionally pro­
tected, these ethnic enclaves do not provide true autonomy. For 
instance, majority-black Chelsea, Massachusetts was placed into re­
ceivership against the will of its residents by the Massachusetts leg­
islature - its elected representatives were stripped of all but 
191. See, e.g., Michael Coakley, Black Secessionists Hope Separate Means Equal, CHI. 
TRIB., Oct. 19, 1986, at § 1, at 5; Incorporation of Coast Town Divides Community, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 17, 1983, at A18. 
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ceremonial power and the affairs of the city ;were taken over by a 
state administrator.192 A similar fate has befallen Washington, 
D.c.193 
Minority jurisdictions must bear the responsibility of autonomy 
despite being denied the power the term implies. The discourse of 
the organic jurisdiction in particular gives rise to the view that the 
separate jurisdictions are independent, self-contained, autonomous 
and therefore exclusively responsible for their condition. The 
proper relationship between organic communities is that of arms­
length bargainers who owe no obligation of compassion or altruism 
to each other. Ironically, while the synthetic jurisdiction seems to 
promote ruthless atomism amongst individuals, the organic jurisdic­
tion promotes a similarly ruthless atomism at the level of the puta­
tive organic social group. Hence "local control" of public schools is 
advanced as a rationale to block the desegregation of schools that 
were segregated by explicit state policy194 and as a justification for 
the radically unequal distribution of public funds.195 "Local respon­
sibility" is invoked to forestall and fracture effective remedies to 
discrimination that occurred on a regional and statewide scale.196 
Within the community the ethos may be sharing, but among com­
munities it is "every group for itself." 
Moreover, when a jurisdiction is racially defined, racial identity 
also subtly becomes jurisdictionally defined. For instance, the deci­
sion of the middle class to leave economically troubled inner cities 
is called "white flight." The none-too-subtle implication is that 
whites are fleeing black-dominated cities and the problems that 
black dominance has wrought. Not only are those blacks "left be­
hind" in inner cities understood to be responsible for their condi­
tion, but the condition of the black-dominated inner cities serves as 
� concrete commentary on the people who live there, and by exten­
sion, on all black people. The organic nature of the connection be­
tween people and the jurisdiction means that the jurisdiction can be 
seen as an extension of the people.191 
192. See Powers v. Secretary of Admin., 587 N.E.2d 744 (Mass. 1992) (upholding the re­
ceivership of the city of Chelsea, Massachusetts)._ 
193. See, e.g., David A. VISe, D.C, Rescue Agreement Strips Barry's Power: White House, 
Hill Leaders Settle on Plan That Puts COfltrol Board in Charge of Most of City Government, 
WASH. PoST,"July 31, 1997, at Al. 
194. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
195. See San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973). 
196. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
197. See also G?LDBERG, supra_ note 186, at 198-200. 
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This use of the organic jurisdiction was pivotal in undermining 
the constitutional mandate of desegregation established in Brown v. 
Board of Education.198 Less than twenty years after Brown, the 
most important implications of the landmark decision were repudi­
ated by the Supreme Court in Milliken v. Bradley.199 It is no exag­
geration to say that Brown's contemporary relevance is largely 
symbolic. The cultural meaning of the Brown decision is so 
profound as to prevent the Court from directly overturning it, but 
as effective legal precedent it has been reduced to irrelevance. 
The demise of Brown v. Board of Education is a sad story, 
quickly told. In 1971, a federal district court held that Detroit's 
public schools were racially segregated, in violation of the Four­
teenth Amendment. The district court found that because Detroit's 
entire school district was already predominantly black, "relief of 
segregation in the Detroit public schools cannot to be accomplished 
within the corporate geographical limits of the city."200 Accord­
ingly, the court devised a desegregation plan that included the sur­
rounding suburbs of Detroit. Affirming, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals noted that "[i]f we [were to] hold that school district 
boundaries are absolute barriers to a Detroit school desegregation 
plan, we would be opening a way to nullify Brown v. Board of 
Education. "201 
Apparently unafraid of blazing such a trail, the Supreme Court 
reversed. In Milliken, the majority held that because "[t]he record 
. . .  contain[ ed] evidence of de jure segregated conditions only in the 
Detroit schools"202 only Detroit could be required to remedy the 
segregation - even though it was conceded that Detroit alone 
could not do so. 
Significantly, Justice Stewart argued in concurrence that "the 
mere fact of different racial compositions in contiguous districts 
does not itself imply or constitute a violation . . .  in the absence of a 
showing that such disparity was imposed, fostered, or encouraged 
by the State or its political subdivisions."203 Stewart asserted that 
segregation was caused by "unknown and perhaps unknowable fac­
tors such as in-migration, birth rates, economic changes, or cumula-
198. 349 U.S. 294 (1954). 
199. 418 U.S. 717, 748 (1974). 
200. Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914, 916 (E.D. Mich. 1972). 
201. Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 298 (6th Cir. 1973). 
202. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 745. 
203. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 756 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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tive acts of private racial fears."204 Leaving aside the "unknown 
and the unknowable," how could the factors that Stewart actually 
lists cause inter-jurisdictional racial segregation? What do they 
have to do with each other? 
A plausible interpretation of Stewart's factors might be as fol­
lows: Black in-migration to Detroit from the southeastern United 
States205 combined with higher than average black birth rates led to 
a growing black population which, combined with economic decline 
fueled the private racial fears of whites and led to white flight from 
Detroit to its suburbs - and in some cases the creation of separate 
jurisdictions which could protect themselves from the threat of 
more black in-migration. In this narrative, the emergence of segre­
gated jurisdictions has nothing to do with the state that created the 
jurisdictions - instead, each jurisdiction is the result of private as­
sociational decisions. Moreover, far from being perpetrators of seg­
regation, the white suburbanites are victims, forced to flee from the 
alien hordes. To make them participate in desegregation would be 
like sending the Von Trapps back to Austria. 
This interpretation yields a narrative of white flight from racial 
persecution that has become a central concept in the racial identifi­
cation of jurisdictions. It is so accepted in fact, that the Supreme 
Court can take judicial notice of this innocent white flight in order 
to effectively overturn the factual finding of trial courts. In Mis­
souri v. Jenkins,206 the latest in a line of post-Milliken cases, the 
Court struck down a desegregation order that did not require move­
ment across jurisdictional lines, but only attempted to encourage 
such movement through the creation of magnet schools. The lower 
court found that, because white flight from the central city schools 
was a direct result of the segregative practices of Kansas City,207 the 
city was obliged to remedy the resulting segregation. The Supreme 
Court, however, rejected the lower court's factual :findings as "in­
consistent with the typical supposition"208 that white flight is a re­
sponse, not to de jure segregation, but to remedial desegregation 
policies. 
' 
Here I am less interested in the disposition of the case than in 
the evolution of the "white flight from persecution" narrative. In 
204. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 756 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
205. See generally JACKSON, supra note 148, at 150; NrCHor.As LEHMANN, THE PROMISED 
LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND How IT CHANGED AMErucA (1994). 
206. 515 U.S. 70 (1995). 
207. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 11 F.3d 755, 767 (8th Cir. 1993). 
208. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 95. 
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Jenkins, Justice Stewart's white flight narrative is modified; the lib­
eral courts that imposed mandatory desegregation are now catalyz­
ing white racial fears and white flight. In the Jenkins narrative, 
liberal courts create the jurisdictional segregation that stands as a 
barrier to a legal remedy. The implication is clear - white flight is 
a natural response of organic groups to state sponsored attempts to 
disturb their solidarity. Further, any harm suffered by racial minor­
ities isolated in impoverished inner cities is either (1) their own 
fault - after all, who else is around to blame? - or (2) the fault of 
liberal do-gooders who try to change human nature. 
Nowhere in this narrative is it acknowledged that the state is 
responsible for creating local governments, that local jurisdictional 
formation is, as Justice Rehnquist put it in Holt, a "governmental 
technique."209 To say that desegregation remedies are responsible 
for white flight is to confuse a catalyst with a cause. It may be that 
desegregation makes the cities less attractive to whites who, for 
whatever reason, prefer segregation. But the creation of autono­
mous suburbs - suburbs that, thanks to the Court's decision in 
Milliken, are isolated from economic or social responsibility for the 
inner cities - makes white flight possible and attractive. It is the 
state that has given "fearful" whites somewhere to fly to.210 
As for_ the proposition that racial segregation is "natural" one 
should respond "only as natural as racism is." After all, it's no se­
cret that many whites would prefer not to participate in racially in­
tegrated institutions - that's why we need civil rights laws and 
constitutional protections in the first place. But the white flight 
narrative enshrined by the Jenkins Court as the "typical supposi­
tion" suggests that the human nature perpetuating racial segrega­
tion is causally prepolitical. Jenkins is premised on the belief that 
white flight is not itself conditioned by state action. 
This narrative of, white flight from persecution is deceptively 
compelling on a number of levels. It resonates with a great many 
historical narratives of territorial community: a crowd is formed 
into a people through the collective experience of trial,' flight and 
finally redemption in a new promised land.211 The bonds of com­
munity, so lacking in the new world, are supplied by a common foe; 
209. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 72 (1978). 
210. My argument here is far from novel. The Court made precisely this argument when 
considering the decision of a school district to divide a county wide jurisdiction into two 
separate systems: one for the city and one for the county. See Wright v. Council of Emporia, 
407 U.S. 451 (1972). 
. 
211. The most obvious prototype for this narrative comes from the Judeo-Christian reli­
gion, but there are several new world variants, some much less laudable, such as that classic 
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the connection of a people to the soil arises, not from primordial 
legacy, but out of the collective - struggle for autonomy. In other 
contexts, this narrative has had justifiable, even salutary effects. 
But in the context of the contemporary United States, this narrative 
suggests that racial minorities are to blame for racial segregation, 
an inversion of historical responsibility that would make all but the 
most brash of revisionists squirm. 
D. The Interrogation of the Local 
A good deal of contemporary normative social theory identifies 
the greatest threat of oppression with the imposition of homogene­
ity. We are told that we have a moral obligation to recognize differ­
ence and to emb_race plurality and polyphony. B ut the 
"recognition" (meaning both passive ·acknowledgement and active 
affirmation; notice the two faces of this word, how it claims to ex­
clude the possibility of the very value judgment it requires) of dif­
ference can itself be an inquisition. "Difference" is an empty vessel 
and the object of the discourse of difference can never control the 
meaning of the differences that are recognized. Distinctive cultural 
practices become Moynihan's "culture of poverty" with a change in 
inflection; group solidarity becomes clannishness or belligerence by 
moving a few commas. The forum for those who would speak truth 
to power is also the interrogation chamber, the "right to be heard" 
extracts a confession. 
This fetishism of difference and particularity sees with one eye 
closed. Although compulsory homogeneity is a threat, the other, 
unglimpsed side of governmental power is the. incessant production 
of difference, the creation of categories, the explosion of particular­
ities, the making of the Other. To press for the recognition of dif­
ference as an abstract principle is to embrace this process of 
compulsory differentiation and to comply with the distancing and 
social hierarchy it so often entails. The organic conception of juris­
diction facilitates the production of group differences by asserting 
that some territorial identities are natural and must be respected, 
whatever their social consequences. It encourages us to abandon 
pragmatic decisionmaking in favor of deductions from "first princi­
ples" - for example, "always respect organic social groups and 
their need for separation and autonomy." We should reject this 
sterile paradigm and confront the moral ambiguity of difference: 
example of modem cinematography and racism, D.W. Griffith's THE BIRTH OF A NATION, 
supra note 171. 
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differences are constructed as well as repressed, they are imposed 
as well as ignored, they are chains as well as wings. 
JV. TOWARD A THEORY OF JURISDICTION 
A whole history remains to be written of spaces - which would at the 
same time be the history of powers (both these terms in the plural) -
from the great strategies of geo-politics to the little tactics of the 
habitat. . . . .  212 
Jurisdictional boundaries help to promote and legitimate social 
injustice, illegitimate hierarchy and economic inequality. This is not 
to argue that jurisdictional borders are the sole cause of social injus­
tice such that a different jurisdictional system would eliminate ille­
gitimate hierarchy or the evils of poverty. Nor is it to argue that 
promoting and legitimating inequality and social injustice are the 
primary purposes or practical effects of territorial jurisdiction in 
general, or of any jurisdiction in particular. It is to argue that juris­
diction plays an important role in shaping our social and political 
world and our social and political selves. 
Group territorial identification must be understood as part of 
the status quo. The concentration of social groups in formally de­
fined jurisdictions is a discipline that creates a predictable and eas­
ily manageable social order. Territorial identification encourages 
particular types of political and interpersonal subjectivity while dis­
couraging others. Therefore, we should consciously weigh the pros 
and cons of territorial identification. We should ask: what aspects 
of human flourishing are discouraged or excluded and, more impor­
tantly, what identities and subjectivities are produced, encouraged, 
sanctioned or imposed? 
The recent Supreme Court decision in Romer v. Evans213 is in­
structive. In Romer, the Court found that a Colorado ballot initia­
tive that forbade the state or its subdivisions from enacting civil 
rights protections for homosexuals was constitutionally invalid. But 
the Court did not find that homosexuality was a constitutionally 
protected classification. Nor did it overturn its earlier decision in 
Bowers v. Hardwick,214 which upheld the criminalization of homo­
sexual sodomy against a due process challenge. Therefore, the par­
adoxical effect of Romer would seem to be that a state can outlaw 
212. MICHEL FOUCAULT, The Eye of Power, in PoWERIKNOWLEDGE! SELECTED INTER· 
VIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS, 1972-1977, at 146, 149 {Colin Gordon ed. & Colin Gordon ct 
al. trans., 1980). 
213. 517 U.S. 620 {1996). 
214. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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homosexual conduct under Bowers but must allow its localities to 
protect such conduct with antidiscrimination ordinances. 
Romer is subject to several interpretations, but none entirely re­
solve this conceptual paradox.215 Here I will advance an interpreta­
tion based on jurisdictional design. The analysis that follows is not 
a proposal; I do not wish to suggest that the Court should adopt the 
interpretation I am about to advance. Nor do I claim to tease out 
the "true meaning" of this tortured and conflicted opinion.216 In­
stead this interpretation provides a partial account of the motiva­
tions that would move the Court to invalidate the initiative at issue 
in Romer while allowing the state to criminalize homosexual sod­
omy, as it did by leaving Bowers intact. 
Suppose the principle established in Romer is that the state may 
not attempt to selectively disempower localities, in which homosex­
uals or any other statewide minority may enjoy a majority of polit­
ical support, through an initiative passed at the state level where 
those locally favored minorities are overwhelmed by a hostile ma­
jority. This principle acknowledges that the state can, by selectively 
extending the jurisdictional sphere, effectively deny certain minor­
ity groups the ability to influence government even at the local level 
where they may have majority support. 
On this interpretation, Romer is instructive because it highlights 
the significance of jurisdictional architecture in creating group sta­
tuses. Romer protects minority groups, but only when they concen­
trate in "discrete and insular" jurisdictions. This rationale turns 
215. On the one hand, without the jurisdictional distinction (state v. local law) Romer 
must stand for the proposition that neither the state nor its subdivisions can foreclose the 
ability of any disfavored minority (since homosexuals are not members of a protected class) 
to petition government for favorable or protective laws. But it is difficult to understand how 
the Constitution could deny states the power to foreclose state and local protection for con­
duct that they can criminalize under Bowers. Accord Thomas C. Grey, Bowers v. Hardwick 
Diminished, 68 U. CoLO. L. REv. 373, 376-81 (1997). 
One could argue that Bowers allows criminalization of conduct, while Romer protects 
malicious distinctions based on status, but such a status/conduct split is largely semantic: the 
state could simply reword the unconstitutional law to prohibit protective legislation for ho­
mosexual conduct. Then, despite the existence of laws protecting homosexual status, any 
actor who wished to discriminate could claim to do so on the basis of the conduct or sus­
pected conduct of the victim, rather than his or her status as homosexual. The attempt to 
"take the sex out of homosexuals," as Janet Halley aptly puts it, is unlikely to succeed in 
protecting them as homosexuals. See Janet E. Halley, Romer v. Hardwick, 68 U. CoLo. L. 
REv. 429, 433 (1997) (emphasis in original). 
216. This interpretation is therefore entirely unlike the many post-Romer disquisitions 
which tried to "make sense" of the opinion. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and 
Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REv. 203, 222 (1996) (arguing for a "clear, 
strong, unbroken analytic and rhetorical thread" in Romer); Daniel Farber & Suzzana 
Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CoNST. CoMMENTARY 257 (1996); Grey, supra note 215, 375-
76. Improving judicial opinions through (re)interpretation is certainly a noble endeavor, but 
it is not mine here. 
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James Madison's argument for the extended sphere217 on its head. 
It, in effect, holds that any state-wide minority group has a right to 
its victory in a local political process free of interference from a 
hostile majority in the extended sphere of state politics. 
Of course, it follows that the minority group has no protection 
from a hostile local majority. So held the Sixth Circuit in Equality 
Foundation of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati. 218 In Equal­
ity Foundation, a decision upholding a Cincinnati city charter 
amendment that forbids "special rights" for homosexuals was re­
manded by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of 
Romer. The Cincinnati charter amendment was substantially iden­
tical to the amendment at issue in Romer.219 Both forbade civil 
rights protections for homosexuals. Both were enacted by voter ini­
tiative. Both amended the foundational document of the jurisdic­
tion - the state constitution in Romer, the city charter in Equality 
Foundation - and were for that reason especially difficult to re­
verse through the normal political process. The primary difference 
between the cases was that Romer involved a law of statewide ap­
plicability while Equality Foundation involved an initiative of local 
applicability.220 On remand, the Sixth Circuit held that Romer did 
not apply: 
217. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). 
218. 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997). 
219. Amendment 2, at issue in Romer, reads: 
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation. Neither 
the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agen· 
cies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce 
any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual 
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis 
of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota 
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution 
shall be in all respects self-executing. 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996). 
Issue 3, the charter amendment at issue in Equality Foundation reads: 
NO SPECIAL CLASS STATUS MAY BE GRANTED BASED UPON SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION, CONDUCT OR RELATIONSHIPS. 
The City of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commissions may not enact, adopt, 
enforce or administer any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy which provides that ho· 
mosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or relationship constitutes, 
entitles, or otherwise provides a person with the basis to have any claim of minority or 
protected status, quota preference or other preferential treatment. This provision of the 
City Charter shall in all respects be self-executing. Any ordinance, regulation, rule or 
policy enacted before this amendment is adopted that violates the foregoing prohibition 
shall be null and void and of no force or effect. 
Equality Foundation, 128 F.3d at 291. 
220. The state versus local distinction flies in the face of decades of established law which 
hold that the states may not do through their subdivisions what the constitution prohibits 
them from doing directly. See, e.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of 
Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 361 (1992) ("[A] State . . .  may not avoid the strictures of 
the Commerce Clause by [acting] through subdivisions of the State, rather than through the 
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[Colorado Amendment 2] deprived a politically unpopular minority, . 
but no others, of the political ability to obtain special legislation at 
every level of state government, including within local jurisdictions 
having pro-gay rights majorities . . . .  
. . . [U]nlike Colorado Amendment 2, which interfered with the 
expression of local community preferences in that state, the Cincin­
nati Charter Amendment constituted a direct expression of the local 
community will . . . . [It was] designed in part to preserve community 
values and character . . . . 221 
In order to distinguish the anti-gay legislation at issue in Romer 
and the nearly identical Cincinnati charter amendment, the Sixth 
Circuit offered a paradigmatic defense of the organic local jurisdic­
tion: "Unlike a state government, which is composed of discrete 
and quasi-independent levels and entities such as cities, counties, 
and the general state government, a municipality is a unitary local 
political subdivision or unit comprised, fundamentally, of the terri­
tory and residents within its geographical boundaries."222 
In this light, the Romer court needed to overrule Holt, not Bow­
ers. In Romer, a crucial issue was the difficulty of obtaining gay­
friendly legislation at the state wide level. By denying gay-friendly 
groups the ability to advance favorable legislation at the local level, 
Amendment 2 left available only the arduous route of lobbying for 
reform at the state level. The Court noted that under Amendment 
2 gay citizens could "obtain specific protection against discrimina­
tion only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the State 
Constitution."223 Similarly in Holt, Tuscaloosa's extraterritorial ju­
risdiction denied residents of the disenfranchised police jurisdiction 
the possibility of local influence, leaving only the possibility of an 
State itself."); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 {1973). To borrow the logic of Justice 
Rehnquist in an analogous context, on the Equality Foundation rationale taken to is extreme, 
the state legislature "need merely divide the State in half," passing one antigay ordinance for 
the Northern half of the state and one for the Southern half. "The law would be immune 
from [Romer] scrutiny simply because it was not phrased in terms of state citizenship." See 
United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Camden City v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 217 n.9 
{1984). 
221. Equality Foundation, 128 F.3d at 297 (emphasis added). 
222. Equality Foundation, 128 F.3d at 298 n.9 (emphasis added). If this idea sounds fa­
miliar, it should. It is more or less one idea that underlies the Voting Rights Act. See 42 
U.S.C. § 1973 {1995). By, in some cases, mandating majority-minority electoral districts the 
Act is designed to protect for racial minorities a sphere of jurisdictional influence free from 
interference by hostile majorities at the state level. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973{c). The difference 
between Romer and the Voting Rights Act in this regard is that the Act envisions a conscious 
political process for designing electoral districts, while Romer treats jurisdictional boundaries 
as given. Therefore the Act seeks to alter the jurisdictional boundaries themselves, while 
Romer only protects the local majorities that happen to emerge. 
223. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631. 
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arduous statewide campaign for reform. In both Romer and Holt 
the complaint was that a select group of citizens was denied the 
ability to influence government at the local level while others were 
able to do so. And in both cases the response was that the group 
was on equal footing with all other citizens at the level of state 
government. 
The jurisdictional architecture at issue in Romer and Equality 
Foundation illustrates several points. One point is fairly obvious 
but often overlooked: territorial identification cuts both ways. Lo­
cal autonomy may protect gay rights ordinances in Aspen and Den­
ver, but it would also allow antigay laws in more conservative 
jurisdictions such as Cincinnati. At best, we have a normative prin­
ciple of compulsory provincialism:224 minority sub groups can ex­
pect favorable treatment only when they accept social isolation and 
only within the boundaries of "their" jurisdiction. In the broader 
public culture, social assimilation is required (don't ask, don't tell). 
The social landscape this anticipates is one of fragmented, even 
antagonistic quasi-autonomous jurisdictions. Each political terri­
tory becomes both a haven and a prison for its residents. As in the 
medieval walled city, freedom within the friendly city's walls yields 
to tyranny outside thdse walls. Just as the medieval serf who lived 
outside the city was subject to the whip of the feudal lord or the law 
of the highwayman, so too the homosexual who lives in a hostile 
local environment has no defense against local prejudice. Compul­
sory provincialism forces marginal sub groups into a limited 
number of well identified enclaves. Those who refuse to or cannot 
retreat to these "safe havens" are understood to have accepted 
their fate on the outside. 
This is the best we can expect from territorial autonomy. But 
even this impoverished autonomy is far from certain. For what 
counts as respect for local difference from one perspective is the 
disproportionate power of a faction from another. For instance, in 
Romer Justice Scalia puts Madison back on his feet, complaining in 
dissent: 
[B]ecause those who engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside in 
disproportionate numbers in certain communities, have high disposa­
ble income, and, of course, care about homosexual-rights issues much 
more ardently than the public at large, they possess political power 
much greater than their numbers, both locally and statewide . . . .  
224. See Ford, Geography and Sovereignty, supra note 150, at 1401-07, 1417-18 (describ· 
ing the emergence of a judicially enforced territorial provincialism). 
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. . . [Amendment 2] sought to counter both the geographic concen­
tration and the disproportionate political power of homosexuals . . . . 
It put directly, to all the citizens of the State, the question: Should 
homosexuality be given special protection? They answered no.225 
Local difference is easily recast as factionalism and the courts 
toggle back and forth between the two perspectives. Sometimes lo­
cal decisions are lauded because they supposedly reflect an organic 
lifestyle deserving of respect. At other times local decisions are 
denigrated as the result of the disproportionate and concentrated 
influence of a faction. Territorial identification thus provides no 
guarantee of autonomy, no safe haven from outside influence. It 
can just as easily facilitate stereotyping and targeting an unpopular 
group. 
Finally, jurisdiction is not a neutral slate on which a preexisting 
and authentic identity can be inscribed. The choice to adopt a terri­
torial self definition necessarily alters the nature of the self that is 
so defined.226 Scalia understands homosexual identity as an urban 
and elite identity, a sort of decadent, sybaritic indulgence of the 
effete upper classes.227 My suggestion is that many homosexuals 
are pushed into - and are complicit in - such an identification by 
the compulsory provincialism that the majority in Romer offers. 
Justice Scalia may play the harp but Justice Kennedy, the author of 
the majority opinion, called the tune. The problem here is not sim­
ply that homosexuals who don't fit the model are denied protection 
of any kind. What about rural homosexuals or those in smaller sub­
urbs? The problem is also that those urban, well-to-do homosexu­
als whom Romer ostensibly protects are forced into a fairly narrow 
range of identities.228 This is not to say that their authentic selves 
are being repressed but instead that their authentic selves - at any 
225. Romer, 517 U.S. at 645-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (internal cita­
tions omitted). Another example of the view that minority controlled jurisdictions are illegit­
imate factions is found in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1990), a decision 
that implicitly described minority controlled cities as factions that required constitutional 
surveillance against "reverse discrimination" and in-group political patronage. 
226. See Ford, Geography and Sovereignty, supra note 150, at 1416-17 (observing that 
identity formation will be affected by territorial arrangements). 
227. Scalia chides: "When the Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with 
the knights rather than the villeins - and more specifically with the Templars, reflecting the 
views and values of the lawyer class from which the Court's members are drawn." Romer, 
517 U.S. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
228. Accord K. Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections, in COLOR 
C0Nsc10us 30, 99 (K. Appiah & Amy Gutmann eds., 1996) ("What demanding respect for 
people as blacks or as gays requires is that there be some scripts that go with being an Afri­
can-American or having same sex desires. There will be proper ways of being black and gay 
. . . . It is at this point that someone who takes autonomy seriously will want to ask whether 
we have not replaced one type of tyranny with another."). My point here is simply that 
group-identified jurisdictions help to map out such compulsory scripts. 
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rate the only selves they're going to get - are being built in part by 
this process of concentration and territorial identification. 
We should ask whether the identities and territories produced 
through compulsory territorialism are the type of identities that can 
contribute to a healthy and just society. We should also ask 
whether such identities contribute to the human flourishing of those 
who, however freely or unwillingly, adopt them. Finally, we should 
ask, along with Anthony Appiah, whether these are identities that 
we will want to live with in the long run.229 Because I fear the an­
swer to these questions is no, I believe we should reject territorial 
provincialism and begin designing the legal and social geographies 
of the future.230 
We are building the jurisdictions of the future today. A self­
conscious theory of territorial jurisdiction - which would also be a 
theory of the spatial organization of the political, the economic and 
the social - would better allow us to do so. A theory of jurisdic­
tion would draw on a wide range of sources: the analysis developed 
by James Madison and the American federalists, the judicial opin­
ions involving the commerce clause and the privileges and immuni­
ties clause of the Constitution, the field of international law, the 
study of urban development and the built environment (including 
urban planning and architecture), and recent developments in the 
study of the spatiality of social institutions231 and everyday life.232 
A theory of jurisdiction might be developed in law schools, plan­
ning departments, schools of government and policy, departments 
of political philosophy and schools of design and architecture. The 
site of such study is less important that the recognition that it is 
badly needed. A failure to study the politics and legalities of space 
is a failure to map law's territory. 
V. CONCLUSION: FEAR AND LOATHING IN THE JURISDICTION 
OF THE FUTURE 
Already the Great Khan was leafing through his atlas, over the 
maps of cities that menace in nightmares and maledictions: Enoch, 
Babylon, Yahooland, Butua, Brave New World. 
229. See id. 
230. I hope it is clear that this discussion applies to many social groups, not just homosex­
uals. I use Romer because so many have (in my view mistakenly) hailed the decision as a 
victory for gay rights. Romer may well be part of an unarticulated governmental project of 
territorial sorting - one that I fear will not end well for any of the groups so sorted. 
231. See, e.g., HARVEY, supra note 173; EDWARD W. So1A, Pos1MODERN GEOGRAPHIES: 
THE REASSERTION OF SPACE IN CRITICAL SOCIAL THEORY (1989). 
232. See, e.g., MICHEL DECERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE (1984). 
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He said: "It is all useless, if the last landing plactq .can only be the 
infernal city, and it is there that, in ever-narrowing circles, the current 
is drawing us." 
And Polo said: "The inferno of the living is not something that 
will be; if there is one, it is what is already here, the inferno we live 
every day, that we form by being together. There are two ways to 
escape suffering it. The first is easy for many: accept the inferno and 
become such a part of it that you can no longer see it. The second is 
risky and demands constant vigilance and apprehension: seek and 
learn to recognize who and what, in the midst of the inferno, are not 
inferno, then make them endure, give them space."233 
So is jurisdiction something to be feared, loathed, condemned? 
Is it the product of some sinister plot, born of medieval tyrants, 
developed by mercurial mercantilists, refined in the academies of 
empires, and finally perfected behind the closed doors of the mili­
tary and in the high towers of Capital (and who is to say these two 
aren't joined, by interest, by structure, by subterranean tunnels 
reaching deep into the bowels of the earth, "like wormes in the en­
trayles of a naturall man)?"234 
This would make for interesting reading, no doubt. But the 
story I have offered, though not as dramatic, is, I hope, as fascinat­
ing in its own way. What I have argued is that territorial jurisdic­
tion - something that seems timeless, natur?I and indeed 
inevitable - is in fact an invention, an invention as essential to the 
development of the modem world as the tungsten filament. 
Territorial jurisdiction is nothing less than the map of the law's 
interaction with society. It embodies the deepest tensions and con­
flicts in our aspirations for human civilization. If territorial jurisdic­
tion seems inevitable, it is because the aspirations and fears it 
embodies are inevitable. The organic jurisdiction vindicates our as­
piration for community, social harmony, oedipal completion, the 
nostalgia of the whole and the one. Yet it also evokes our terror at 
suffocation, the destruction of the unique ego, totalitarianism. The 
spirit of community threatens to become the mentality of the mob; 
group culture bleeds into the groupthink of the cult. The synthetic 
jurisdiction is the child of our desire for mastery of an alien world, 
for order, rationality, utility, the universal. Yet it also conjures the 
horror of alienation, isolation, the ghostless controlling machine, a 
bloodless world in which interpersonal connection is limited to the 
arms-length bargain, in which the only meaning is the agnostic logic 
233. CALVINO, supra note 183, at 164-65. 
234. THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 375 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1968) 
(1651). 
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of exchange. Little wonder then that we oscillate between ex­
tremes, each of which is equivalent to our most passionate desire 
and our deepest phobias.235 "Institutional fetishism" is literally ac­
curate to describe our relationship to jurisdiction. 
This conflict is intractable, at least in the terms in which our 
contemporary institutions force it upon us. And so I fear that I 
must violate your expectations that we will end \vith some hopeful 
prediction, better yet some prescription that will help us to over­
come the difficulties that this Article has described, like the hero 
that arrives in the nick of time. Instead, the approach this Article 
suggests is pragmatic, but pragmatic in the tragic, continental tone 
rather than the more familiar optimistic tone of the Americans 
James, Pierce and Dewey. The conflicts that haunt legal analysis in 
general and our understanding of jurisdiction in particular may re­
sist logical resolution. The faith that reform or even revolution can 
resolve these contradictions - unifying the severed psyche and 
banishing alienation - may only deliver us all the more quickly 
into their grasp. We may be doomed to reproduce the same ten­
sions in different form, over and over again. The meaning of his­
tory may not be the heroic story of progress and perfection, nor the 
epic of decline, rebirth and redemption, but the blank tragedy of 
meaningless repetition. 
It is this realization that demands constant vigilance, with no 
guarantee of safety, that demands we make the effort and take the 
risk to find and nurture that which may be more noble than it is 
familiar. The history of space and spaces offers a rogues' gallery of 
cartographers, imperialists, merchant adventurers, medieval rulers, 
town constables, urban visionaries, architects, judges and jurists. 
But in all of these there are only protagonists, no heroes. The he­
roes and heroines, perhaps, are yet to come. 
235. See Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BuFF. L. 
REv. 205, 211-13 (1979). 
